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UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE TO
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
SUSAN LANDRUM
This Article evaluates how state courts have applied the
unconscionability doctrine to contracts, including those involving
arbitration agreements. Numerous scholars have been critical of state
courts’ application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration
agreements and have argued that, because state courts are often skeptical
or even hostile to arbitration, at least some state courts have used the
unconscionability doctrine more often to invalidate arbitration
agreements than other types of contract provisions. These assumptions
hold true for some individual states or limited time periods, but further
research was necessary to determine if the assumptions are true more
broadly. For purposes of this study, I analyzed the unconscionability
case law, a total of 460 cases, from twenty states—Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont—
during the time period from 1980 to 2012. The results of my research
demonstrate that there is significant variation in how courts apply the
unconscionability doctrine. Moreover, this Article shows that, for many
of these states, the assumptions that scholars have had regarding state
courts’ hostility to arbitration agreements, and those courts’ willingness to
use the unconscionability doctrine as a means of invalidating arbitration
provisions, are not always supported by the case law. Instead of applying
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University of South Carolina; Ph.D., 1999, The Ohio State University; J.D., 2009, The Ohio
State University Moritz College of Law. For her helpful comments on prior drafts, I am
especially grateful to Sarah Rudolph Cole. This Article also benefited from feedback from
participants at the Sixth Annual Works-in-Progress Conference of the Association of
American Law Schools, Section on Dispute Resolution.
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generalized assumptions, it is necessary to delve deeper into the case law
of each individual state to understand that state’s use of the
unconscionability doctrine in the context of arbitration agreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States Supreme Court has observed on more than one
1
occasion, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “was enacted in 1925 in
2
response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”
Even after passage of the FAA, however, there have continued to be
cases where courts treat arbitration agreements with more skepticism
3
than other contracts. In fact, legal scholars have long argued that at
least some state courts routinely view arbitration agreements with more
hostility than other types of contract provisions and, thus, are more
likely to use contract defenses—most specifically, the unconscionability
4
doctrine—to invalidate arbitration clauses. While it is undeniably true
1. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Federal Arbitration
Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)); see also
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (noting that the FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common
law and had been adopted by American courts”). Legal scholars have also discussed the
history of courts’ treatment, prior to the passage of the FAA, of arbitration agreements. See,
e.g., Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 97–102 (2012); Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v.
Keating Revisited: Twenty-Five Years in Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 333–
35 (2010) (discussing treatment of arbitration by British and early United States courts);
Preston Douglas Wigner, Comment, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive Approach
to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995) (same).
3. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (“The purpose and
procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be
inconsistent with that goal.”); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201–03, 205
(1956) (“For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially
affects the cause of action created by the State.”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The
Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008) (“Some lower courts (mostly certain state courts, but also a
few federal courts) view arbitration with more skepticism, especially in cases involving
consumers or employees who have signed nonnegotiated arbitration agreements embedded in
standard-form contracts.”); Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and
Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2035, 2044–46 (2011) (“While arbitration
provisions are favored under the FAA, they are viewed far more skeptically by courts
applying unconscionability to refuse enforcement of one-sided arbitration provisions.”).
4. See generally Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal
Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006); Bruhl, supra note 3, at 1466–68; Steven J.
Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469; Friedman, supra
note 3, at 2045, 2067; Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute
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that state courts have applied the unconscionability doctrine to
5
arbitration clauses, often in a way that is different than those same
6
courts have applied the doctrine to other types of contracts, the story of
the unconscionability doctrine in recent decades is far more complex
than it may first appear on the surface.
As previously mentioned, within the past decade some legal scholars
have evaluated state courts’ application of the unconscionability
doctrine to arbitration agreements and have come to the conclusion that
courts still often apply unconscionability in a way that demonstrates
7
hostility to arbitration. Usually these scholars have focused on a very
limited number of cases or have analyzed only a small time period in
8
coming to this conclusion. Their work has provided valuable insights
regarding inconsistencies in state courts’ unconscionability analysis and
the importance of courts treating arbitration agreements the same way
that they treat other types of contracts. At the same time, however,
such an approach may have the tendency to focus on outliers that are
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249 (2006); David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
387 (2012); Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609 (2009); Lucille M. Ponte,
Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Clauses and a
Proposal for Improving the Quality of These Online Consumer “Products,” 26 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 119 (2011); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as
a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004). In
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court cited Broome’s and Randall’s
articles for the proposition that California courts are more likely to declare arbitration
agreements unconscionable than other types of contracts. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at
1747 (citing Broome, supra at 54, 66; Randall, supra at 186–87).
5. See, e.g., Wigginton v. Dell, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 541 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Brown v. MHN
Gov’t Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948 (Wash. 2013).
6. See Broome, supra note 4, at 54.
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8. For example, Professor Susan Randall compared unconscionability claims in cases
from 1982 to 1983 and from 2002 to 2003 and concluded that, during the earlier period, courts
found nonarbitration and arbitration agreements unconscionable at the same rate, but, twenty
years later, courts were twice as likely to find arbitration agreements to be unconscionable
than other types of contracts. See Randall, supra note 4, at 187, 194. More recently, Professor
Lucille M. Ponte evaluated the special legal challenges associated with applying the
unconscionability doctrine to clickwrap dispute resolution clauses in online consumer
contracts. See generally Ponte, supra note 4. However, Ponte’s article discussed a range of
examples of how various courts have addressed the issue rather than taking a quantitative
approach. See id. For further discussion of the relevant scholarly research on this topic, see
infra Part III.
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not necessarily representative of a state’s general approach to the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, or it may illustrate a short-term
trend in unconscionability analysis that is not representative of the
courts’ approach to this issue over a longer period of time.
In order to have a fuller understanding of how state courts apply the
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements, it is necessary to
analyze those courts’ approaches to unconscionability analysis over an
extended period of time, comparing the application of the doctrine to
both arbitration agreements and other types of contracts. This Article
does just that. Specifically, this Article explores how, since 1980, state
appellate courts have applied the unconscionability doctrine to all types
9
of contracts, including those involving arbitration agreements. In all, I
have analyzed the unconscionability case law from twenty states, which
10
were chosen from across the United States. All together, this case law
11
included a total of 460 appellate cases. From this case law I have
determined that (1) some state courts have rarely, if ever, used the
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate contract provisions, whether or
9. I chose to only address appellate cases, including those from intermediate state
appellate courts and state supreme courts, because very few trial court opinions are accessible
on Westlaw. This study utilizes both published and unpublished state appellate court
opinions to the extent that they are available on Westlaw. I did not include cases in which the
state appellate court applied the unconscionability law of another state, i.e., an Ohio court
applying Kentucky unconscionability law. I also did not include cases in which a federal court
applied state substantive law regarding unconscionability. Thus, the only cases included in
this study were cases in which a state appellate court applied its own state’s law regarding the
unconscionability doctrine. Moreover, because courts often apply the unconscionability
doctrine differently in domestic relations cases, such as those dealing with prenuptial
agreements or marital settlement agreements, than they do to other types of cases, I did not
include domestic relations unconscionability cases in my research.
10. The twenty states include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont. I
consciously chose not to include California, as Stephen Broome’s article has already looked at
California’s unconscionability case law in significant detail, albeit for a shorter period of time
than the instant study. See generally Broome, supra note 4. I wanted to include states that
may have been referenced in other scholarly articles, but without the amount of attention that
California has received.
11. This number does not include cases where unconscionability was merely mentioned
as a legal concept, i.e., as one of the possible defenses in a breach of contract action, but the
unconscionability doctrine was not actually applied in the case. I have included three types of
cases in this study: (1) cases in which the court determined that the challenged contract
provision was unconscionable; (2) cases in which the court determined that the challenged
contract provision was not unconscionable; and (3) cases in which the court considered the
unconscionability issue but remanded to the trial court because the issue needed to be
considered there in the first instance.
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not the challenged provisions are associated with arbitration; (2) other
states have evenly applied the unconscionability doctrine to all types of
contracts; (3) at some points in their history, some state courts may have
been more inclined to hold an arbitration clause unconscionable, but
that inclination does not reflect their long-term tendencies or the
current status of their law; and (4) a small number of states’ cases do
reflect the stereotype of hostility towards arbitration, at least in some
12
form. Thus, the immediate lesson to take from this analysis is that
there is much more complexity to the issue than what might appear on
the surface.
In Part II of this Article, I summarize the general law related to the
unconscionability doctrine in both the arbitration and non-arbitration
context. Part III provides a little more context for the scholarly debate
over the application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration
agreements by setting up what we have learned so far from this
scholarship and what questions still remain unanswered. Then, Part IV
discusses the results of the instant study, including (1) the large-scale
numbers demonstrating what has happened collectively throughout the
time period of the study, and (2) the numbers broken down by state,
focusing on the range of state court approaches to unconscionability
issues. Having set out the numbers, the final part draws conclusions
about what the numbers show us about how courts apply
13
unconscionability to arbitration agreements. In doing so, I argue that
some of the unease regarding how state courts apply unconscionability
may be unnecessary, and I set out what areas of concern still exist for
14
the future.
II. THE GENERAL LAW ON UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF
BOTH ARBITRATION AND NON-ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In order to have a context for this Article’s analysis of
unconscionability outcomes in state courts’ contract cases, it is
important to understand the intersection of the law governing
arbitration agreements and general contract law. That relationship is
dictated, at least to a certain extent, by federal law, including the FAA
15
and U.S. Supreme Court case law interpreting that Act. However,
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part IV; infra Table 2.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr.,
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contract law in general and the unconscionability doctrine specifically
16
are primarily products of state law, not federal law.
Thus, in the
remainder of Part II, this Article sets forth the basic relevant principles
of federal and state law with respect to arbitration agreements, state
contract law, and the unconscionability doctrine.
A. The Intersection of Arbitration Agreements and General Contract Law
Because arbitration agreements are contracts, the rules that apply to
17
other contracts should also apply to arbitration agreements.
In
general, the construction, interpretation, and enforcement of contracts
are governed by state law, not federal law. There is more complexity,
however, in cases involving arbitration agreements. As mentioned
supra, unlike other types of contracts, the starting point for arbitration
18
agreements is federal law, specifically the FAA. Section 2 of the FAA
provides the foundation for courts’ evaluations of arbitration
agreements by requiring that an arbitration agreement “shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
19
in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Courts have interpreted
this provision to mean that contract defenses such as duress,
unconscionability, and mistake apply to arbitration agreements, just as
20
those defenses apply to other types of contracts.
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Preston v.
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
16. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2784 n.7 (2010) (“The
question of unconscionability . . . is one of state law.” (citing Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9)); Fid.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 174 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“Contract and real property law are traditionally the domain of state law.” (citing Aronson
v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55
(1979))).
17. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1745–46; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
18. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); see also supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The New Mexico Supreme Court has noted that this provision requires
consideration of both state contract law and federal law interpreting the FAA. Rivera v. Am.
Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 810 (N.M. 2011).
20. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1746; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 686–
87. But see Edward P. Boyle & David N. Cinotti, Beyond Nondiscrimination: AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion and the Further Federalization of U.S. Arbitration Law, 12 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 373, 374 (2012) (arguing that AT&T Mobility LLC “increases the federal
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Although the FAA provides that ordinary contract defenses, such as
unconscionability, may make arbitration agreements unenforceable in
certain circumstances, the problem arises when a court applies those
defenses differently to arbitration agreements than to other types of
21
contract provisions.
The U.S. Supreme Court has provided some
22
guidance for other courts in this context. The most obvious situation
that would run afoul of the FAA is where a state’s statutory or case law
23
prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim. Some
cases, however, involve much more complexity than a blatant conflict
restraints on state contract law by holding that even the application of a generally available
contract defense like unconscionability, as interpreted by a state’s highest court, can be
preempted under the FAA” (citing AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting))). One scholar speculated that, after AT&T Mobility, the unconscionability
doctrine may no longer have the same potential to challenge arbitration agreements. See
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center,
Concepcion, and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 380 (2011)
(“In the wake of Concepcion, one wonders what if anything is left of the doctrine of
unconscionability in the realm of arbitration agreements. Coupled with Rent-A-Center,
Concepcion appears to have dramatically diminished the potential scope of this primary tool
for judicial policing of overreaching.”). However, as this study demonstrates, courts have
continued to apply the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements post-AT&T
Mobility LLC and it is unclear what the long-term effect of this case will be.
21. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (“We note . . . the choice-of-law issue that arises when
defenses such as . . . unconscionability arguments are asserted. In instances such as these, the
text of § 2 provides the touchstone for choosing between state-law principles and the
principles of federal common law envisioned by the passage of that statute: An agreement to
arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, ‘save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ Thus state law,
whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)) (citing Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
22. See generally Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per
curiam); AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008);
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. 681; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995); Perry, 482 U.S. 483; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1; Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967).
23. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1203–04 (“West Virginia’s
prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death
claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type
of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.”); AT&T Mobility
LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747; Preston, 552 U.S. at 353, 362–63 (holding that the FAA preempts
state law granting the state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide an issue that the
parties agreed by contract to arbitrate); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687 (“Courts may
not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions.”).
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with the FAA. Specifically, the Supreme Court has observed that a
generally applicable contract defense could still be preempted by the
24
FAA if courts apply it in a way that disfavors arbitration.
One
example of this would be if a court found a contract unconscionable
solely because it determined that an arbitration clause violated public
25
policy in a way that other contracts would not. Even prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
scholars remarked that, in many cases, there was significant difficulty in
determining whether a court had inconsistently and unfavorably applied
26
a generally-applicable contract doctrine to an arbitration agreement.
Furthermore, in applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents
regarding the FAA, some state courts have also articulated a strong
policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. For example, on
multiple occasions the Ohio Supreme Court has affirmed this
presumption in favor of arbitration agreements, noting that “an
arbitration clause is to be upheld just as any other provision in a
27
contract should be respected.” In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court has
24. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513
U.S. at 281; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. To illustrate this point, the Supreme Court provided
the following examples that would be preempted by the FAA: (1) a court refusing to enforce
a consumer arbitration agreement because the agreement did not have a provision allowing
judicially monitored discovery; (2) a court determining that an arbitration agreement that did
not follow the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) a court invalidating an arbitration
agreement that did not allow a determination by a jury panel or its equivalent. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
25. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204 (noting that, to the extent that
the state court’s unconscionability finding was based on the court’s determination that “a
predispute arbitration agreement that applies to claims of personal injury or wrongful death
against nursing homes ‘clearly violates public policy,’” such a finding would be preempted by
the FAA (quoting Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 294 (W. Va. 2011),
vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1201)); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at
493 n.9 (“Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court
to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.”).
26. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal
Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1189, 1201, 1202 n.75 (2011); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 408–11 (2004); David S.
Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L.
REV. 541, 558–62, 568–70 (2004). Legal scholars have continued to express concern about
this issue after AT&T Mobility LLC. See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the
Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 743–44 (2012).
27. Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 865 (Ohio 1998) (“An arbitration clause
in a contract is generally viewed as an expression that the parties agree to arbitrate
disagreements within the scope of the arbitration clause, and, with limited exceptions, an
arbitration clause is to be upheld just as any other provision in a contract should be
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noted that “Ohio’s strong policy favoring arbitration is consistent with
28
federal law supporting arbitration.” Because there is such a strong
presumption in favor of arbitration, the Ohio Supreme Court has
29
instructed that “all doubts should be resolved in its favor.” Other state
courts have also echoed the principle that, because of the FAA and U.S.
Supreme Court precedents applying that Act, there is a strong
30
presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration agreements.
B. The Unconscionability Doctrine
In addition to managing the potentially complex legal issues created
by the intersection of the FAA and general contract law, courts also
must navigate the murky depths of the unconscionability doctrine itself.
As discussed infra, the unconscionability doctrine’s evolution over time
has not always resulted in clarity of terms or consistency of application.
The result is that, even without the arbitration context, states have
developed varying approaches to the unconscionability doctrine.
1. The Historical and Statutory Basis of the Unconscionability Doctrine
For purposes of this Article, it is also important to understand the
unconscionability doctrine more generally.
The concept of
31
unconscionability has roots going back to English common law.
Traditionally, a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at
respected.”); see also Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 411–12 (Ohio 2009); Taylor
Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 19 (Ohio 2008); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
590 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ohio 1992) (plurality opinion).
28. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am., 884 N.E.2d at 19 n.1.
29. Hayes, 908 N.E.2d at 412 (citing Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 865 N.E.2d
18, 22 (Ohio 2007)).
30. See, e.g., Falls v. 1CI, Inc, 57 A.3d 521, 529 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (noting that
the federal courts have interpreted the FAA to create a presumption of arbitrability); Pressler
v. Duke Univ., 685 S.E.2d 6, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (same); Greater Canton Ford Mercury,
Inc. v. Ables, 948 So. 2d 417, 422 (Miss. 2007) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court has
followed the U.S. Supreme Court in recognizing “the established federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements” (citing to Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (Miss.
2004))); Kan. City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008) (stating that, under federal law, an arbitration clause’s “broad scope creates a strong
presumption in favor of arbitrability”); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 1285 v. City of
Las Vegas, 929 P.2d 954, 957 (Nev. 1996) (“There is a presumption of arbitrability when a
contract contains an arbitration clause.” (citing Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 1285 v.
City of Las Vegas, 764 P.2d 478, 480–81 (Nev. 1988))).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (quoting Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 28
Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.) 100; 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155)).
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law if it was “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on
32
the other.” Thus, historically, courts recognized unconscionability as a
33
defense to a claim for breach of contract. However, courts have been
more likely to find a contract unconscionable during the past century
34
than before the twentieth century.
The unconscionability doctrine was ultimately codified in the
35
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
All of the states which are
included in this study have adopted the UCC and, specifically, the
36
unconscionability provision.
Although the UCC unconscionability
doctrine applies specifically to contracts for the sale and lease of goods,
37
courts have extended the doctrine to other types of contracts as well.
Moreover, state legislatures have also passed other unconscionability
statutes over time, such as those addressing unconscionable provisions

32. Hume, 132 U.S. at 411 (quoting Earl of Chesterfield, 28 Eng. Rep. at 100; 2 Ves. Sen.
at 155). Missouri courts have referenced this definition from Hume. See, e.g., Swain v. Auto
Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Hume, 132 U.S. at 415). In
another case, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that unconscionability is “an inequality so
strong, gross, and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to one with common sense
without producing an exclamation at the inequity of it.” Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Div. of
Aging v. Brookside Nursing Ctr., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 273, 277 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (quoting
Peirick v. Peirick, 641 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
33. 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 18:1 (4th ed. 2010).
34. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 708–09 (2012) (“[M]odern courts are more likely
than their classical predecessors to question, alter, or reject a contract’s written terms on
grounds of unconscionability or unfair surprise.”); see also Knapp, supra note 4, at 612–13
(describing how the unconscionability doctrine saw the most use in the period after states’
adoption of the UCC, before undergoing “a decade or two of relative dormancy” beginning in
the 1970s).
35. U.C.C. § 2-302 & cmt. 1 (2012–2013); see also 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33,
§ 18:1.
36. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-302 (2001); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 4-2-302 (2013); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-302 (West 2009); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302 (LexisNexis 2002);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-302 (2002); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 400.2-302 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2302 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.2302 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 382-A:2-302 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020 (2013); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A,
§ 2-302 (2011).
37. 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, § 18:5.
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38

in residential leases or other types of agreements. Regardless of the
widespread adoption of the unconscionability doctrine, however, one of
the challenges that courts face is the fact that the UCC does not define
39
what makes a contract “unconscionable.”
Instead, the Official
Comment to UCC section 302 provides the following basic test:
“[W]hether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
40
existing at the time of the making of the contract.” The result of this
vague instruction is that courts are left with significant latitude in
41
applying the doctrine to specific contracts.
38. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2717 (2009) (unconscionability and foreclosure
consulting contracts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104A.2108 (unconscionability and lease
provisions); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.230 (LexisNexis 2010) (unconscionability and
rental agreements); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-43 (unconscionability and retail installment sales
contracts); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1310.06 (unconscionability and lease contracts); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4781.48 (LexisNexis 2013) (unconscionability and rental agreements);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (LexisNexis 2004) (unconscionability and rental
agreements); OR. REV. STAT. § 72A.1080 (unconscionability and lease provisions); OR. REV.
STAT. § 90.135 (unconscionability and residential leases); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2.1-108
(unconscionability and lease contracts); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-4-106 (2002) (unconscionability
and insurance contracts).
39. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, §§ 18:8, 18:11; Randall, supra note 4, at 194
(observing that “[u]nconscionability is an open-ended, undefined concept subject to judicial
definition case-by-case”). The lack of definition has historically led to some criticism about
the application of the unconscionability doctrine to individual cases, both before and after
courts began to apply the doctrine to arbitration agreements. See generally Carol B. Swanson,
Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L.
REV. 359 (2001); see also Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why
Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287, 288 (2000) (complaining that the
unconscionability doctrine gives courts “wide latitude,” which they may “manipulate . . . in
order to reach the equitable results they desire”); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 (1967) (describing the
difficulties in defining and applying the unconscionability doctrine in light of section 2-302 of
the Uniform Commercial Code’s “amorphous unintelligibility”); John A. Spanogle, Jr.,
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 931 (1969) (“The primary
problem with [the unconscionability doctrine] is that the concept of unconscionability is
vague, so that neither courts, practicing attorneys, nor contract draftsmen can be certain of its
applicability in any particular situation.”). Moreover, Professor Charles Fried has criticized
the unconscionability doctrine as paternalistic and inconsistent with the concept of
contractual obligation. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 961, 976 (2012); cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability
Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 205–06 (2000) (describing some
examples where the unconscionability doctrine may be applied in a paternalistic manner but
concluding that not all examples are paternalistic).
40. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
41. 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, § 18:8.
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Some states’ statutes may also provide additional guidance regarding
the application of the unconscionability doctrine. For instance, the
statutes in the states that are part of this study make clear that the courts
are to look to the circumstances at the time of contract formation to
determine whether the contract is unconscionable, not the
circumstances at the time that one party seeks to enforce the contract or
42
another seeks to avoid it. Furthermore, depending on the state, if a
court finds the challenged contract provisions to be unconscionable, the
court may have the latitude to choose from several possible statutory
remedies. For example, the court may (1) refuse to enforce the
contract; (2) excise the unconscionable clause and enforce the
remainder of the contract; or (3) “so limit the application of any
43
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” Finally,
in cases where a party argues unconscionability, some states’ statutes
specifically direct the courts to give the parties “a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to [the contract’s] commercial
setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the
44
[unconscionability] determination.” Some courts have interpreted this
type of statutory provision to require an evidentiary hearing for
42. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302(a) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-302(1) (2001);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-302(1) (2013); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-302(1) (West 2009);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302(1) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302(1)
(LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302(1) (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2302(1) (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-302(1) (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302(1)
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-302(1) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.2302(1) (LexisNexis
2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-302(1) (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302(1)
(1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302(1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15(A) (LexisNexis
2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2302(1) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-302(1) (2011).
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15(A); see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302(a); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-2-302(1); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-302(1); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2302(1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302(1); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302(1);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-302(1); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.2302(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-302(1); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 104.2302(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-302(1); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302(1);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302(1);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-302(1).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15(B); see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302(b); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-2-302(2); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-302(2); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2302(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302(2); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302(2);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302(2); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-302(2); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.2302(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-302(2); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 104.2302(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-302(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302(2);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302(2); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302(2);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-302(2).
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unconscionability issues, or at least a specific opportunity for parties to
present evidence regarding the alleged unconscionability and to respond
45
to the opposing party’s submissions.
A state court’s application of the state’s unconscionability statutes
may be affected by other statutes as well. For example, if the contract at
issue is a consumer contract, some states have consumer protection laws
that may interact with the court’s unconscionability analysis to create
46
another layer of complexity. Aside from the FAA, other federal laws
47
Thus, the
may also affect state courts’ unconscionability analysis.
Nevada Supreme Court recently held that, in the healthcare contract
context, the Federal Medicare Act can preempt Nevada’s
48
unconscionability law.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently
determined that its unconscionability analysis of an arbitration
agreement, which was part of a crop insurance contract, was governed
not only by state law governing insurance contracts and the FAA, but
49
also by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and federal regulations related to
45. See, e.g., Hollingshead v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 920 N.E.2d 1254, 1261–62 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009) (holding that, “absent an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court could not have
found the arbitration provisions at issue to be procedurally unconscionable based on the
allegations of the complaint standing alone”); Bargman v. Skilled Healthcare Grp., Inc., 292
P.3d 1, 6 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
regarding whether a challenged contract provision was substantively unconscionable); Olah v.
Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006-Ohio-694, ¶ 29 (Ct. App.) (“[W]hen the circumstances of the
sale are not developed sufficiently in the record to ascertain unconscionability, the trial court
should conduct a hearing to decide the issue.” (citing Molina v. Ponsky, 2005-Ohio-6349, ¶ 18
(Ct. App.))); cf. Moran v. Riverfront Diversified, Inc., 968 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the unconscionability argument, when both parties submitted affidavits in support
of their written arguments and, thus, had been heard).
46. See, for example, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1345.01–1345.13 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013), and cases discussing the intersection
between the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act and unconscionability, Bozich v. Kozusko,
2009-Ohio-6908, ¶¶ 14–20 (Ct. App.); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161,
1169–70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); see also Ramette v. AT&T Corp., 812 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004) (reviewing customer asserted claims of unconscionability and violations of
Illinois’ Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); and Munoz v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 364 (S.C. 2001) (discussing intersection between the FAA and
South Carolina’s Consumer Protection Code).
47. For a recently-published analysis of the intersection between the FAA and the
National Labor Relations Act, see generally Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton
Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV.
1013 (2013).
48. See Pacificare of Nev., Inc. v. Rogers, 266 P.3d 596, 601 (Nev. 2011); Pacificare of
Nev., Inc. v. Meana, No. 55754, 2011 WL 5146064 (Nev. Oct. 27, 2011).
49. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2012). Under the McCarran-
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50

the Federal Crop Insurance Act. Finally, an Illinois appellate court
held that a consumer’s unconscionability claim—regarding the
arbitration clause in a long-distance telephone carrier’s service
51
agreement—was preempted by the Federal Communications Act.
Moreover, although none of the states in this study have statutes that
specifically address unconscionability in the context of arbitration
agreements, in keeping with U.S. Supreme Court precedent and other
cases interpreting the FAA, almost all of the twenty states do have
statutes that make it clear that, generally, arbitration agreements are to
52
be held to the same legal standards as other types of contracts. The
case law language in these states also echoes this theme, regardless of
53
how each state’s courts actually apply the unconscionability doctrine.

Ferguson Act, “state law regulating the business of insurance preempts federal law that does
not specifically govern insurance.” Kremer v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Co., 788 N.W.2d 538, 550
(Neb. 2010).
50. Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501–24 (2012). See generally Kremer, 788
N.W.2d 538.
51. Ramette, 812 N.E.2d at 513–14.
52. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A) (LexisNexis 2008). That statute
provides:
A provision in any written contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy that
subsequently arises out of the contract, or out of the refusal to perform the whole or
any part of the contract, or any agreement in writing between two or more persons
to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the
agreement to submit, or arising after the agreement to submit, from a relationship
then existing between them or that they simultaneously create, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id. (emphasis added); see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010(a), 09.43.330(a) (2012); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-108-206(a) (Supp. 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-206(1) (2013); 710 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 (West 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (2003); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(a) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 572B.06(a) (West Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-5-114(1) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.01(a) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 38.219(1) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:1 (2007); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-7(a) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.6(a) (2011); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 36.454(5), 36.620(1) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-4810(a) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5652(a) (2002). Mississippi does not have an
equivalent statute.
53. See, e.g., Raper v. Oliver House, LLC, 637 S.E.2d 551, 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)
(“The essential thrust of the Federal Arbitration Act, which is in accord with the law of our
state, is to require the application of contract law to determine whether a particular
arbitration agreement is enforceable . . . .” (quoting Futrelle v. Duke Univ., 488 S.E.2d 635,
638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v.
Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 20 (Ohio 2008) (“Arbitration agreements are ‘valid, irrevocable, and
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2. Procedural Unconscionability and Substantive Unconscionability
There are two types of unconscionability: procedural
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.
Most states’
unconscionability doctrines require both procedural unconscionability
and substantive unconscionability before a court will refuse to enforce a
54
contract.
For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has summarized
unconscionability as including both “an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
55
unreasonably favorable to the other party.” However, a minority of
state courts do not require both procedural unconscionability and
substantive unconscionability in order to invalidate a contract on
56
unconscionability grounds. Some states use a sliding scale approach,
enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.’” (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A) (LexisNexis 1992))).
54. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, §§ 18:9–10. See, e.g., Freedman v.
Comcast Corp., 988 A.2d 68, 85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“The prevailing view is that both
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a court to
invalidate a contractual term as unconscionable.” (citing Doyle v. Fin. Am., LLC, 918 A.2d
1266, 1274 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007))); Burch v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 49 P.3d 647, 650 (Nev.
2002); Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio 2009) (stating that a “quantum”
of both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be established in order for a
provision to be unconscionable (citing Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d
1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993))). However, Nebraska’s case law suggests that, outside of
the commercial context, Nebraska courts may not require both substantive and procedural
unconscionability. See Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d 776, 799 (Neb. 2006) (citing
Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577, 590 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992)).
55. Hayes, 908 N.E.2d at 412 (quoting Lake Ridge Acad. v. Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 189
(Ohio 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. For example, Vermont courts do not require procedural unconscionability to find a
contract provision unconscionable. See Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1049 (Vt.
2011). Although Illinois courts appear to have required both procedural and substantive
unconscionability in the past, see Zobrist v. Verizon Wireless, 822 N.E.2d 531, 540 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004), in Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006), the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a finding of unconscionability can be based upon procedural
unconscionability, substantive unconscionability, or both. Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 263 (citing
Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006)). Missouri courts also appear to
not require both procedural and substantive unconscionability. See Ruhl v. Lee’s Summit
Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139 n.2 (Mo. 2010) (“[U]nconscionability can be procedural,
substantive, or a combination of both. There is no need in all cases to show both aspects of
unconscionability.”). The New Mexico Supreme Court has also suggested that both
substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability are not required. See
Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (holding that, “[w]hile
there is a greater likelihood of a contract’s being invalidated for unconscionability if there is a
combination of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, there is no absolute
requirement in our law that both must be present to the same degree or that they both be
present at all”).
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such that if there is a significant amount of substantive
57
unconscionability, less procedural unconscionability is required.
Procedural unconscionability refers to the making of the contract as
58
opposed to the substance of the contract. Therefore, in determining
whether procedural unconscionability exists, courts often consider,
among numerous factors: (1) whether there was a meeting of the minds
59
as to the formation of the agreement; (2) the experience, intelligence,
60
age, and education of the parties; (3) the parties’ relative bargaining
57. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 302 (4th ed.
2004). States that have appeared to advocate a sliding scale approach to unconscionability
analysis include Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, and North Carolina. See, e.g., Razor, 854
N.E.2d at 622; Gonski v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164, 1169–70 (Nev. 2010)
(“Although a showing of both types of unconscionability is necessary before an arbitration
clause will be invalidated, . . . a strong showing of procedural unconscionability mean[s] that
less substantive unconscionability [is] required.” (citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d
1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004))); Cordova, 208 P.3d at 908; Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.,
655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008). Professor Melissa Lonegrass, in particular, has advocated
the use of a sliding scale approach to the unconscionability doctrine. See generally Melissa T.
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to
Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2012).
58. See, e.g., Freedman, 988 A.2d at 85 (“Procedural unconscionability ‘deals with the
process of making a contract . . . .” (quoting Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 744
(Md. 2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300
S.W.3d 556, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). Alternatively, Professor Arthur Allen Leff once
defined procedural unconscionability as “bargaining naughtiness.” Leff, supra note 39, at
487.
59. See, e.g., Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 500 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)
(Price, J., dissenting) (stating that “[p]rocedural unconscionability . . . deals with the
formalities of making the contract and focuses on whether the parties had a voluntary and
sufficient meeting of the minds to bind each other to the terms of the writing”); Wascovich v.
Personacare of Ohio, Inc., 943 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that
“[p]rocedural unconscionability concerns the formation of the agreement and occurs when no
voluntary meeting of the minds is possible” (quoting Porpora v. Gatliff Bldg. Co., 828 N.E.2d
1081, 1083 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dan Ryan Builders,
Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 558 (W. Va. 2012) (stating that “[p]rocedural unconscionability
arises from inequities, improprieties, or unfairness in the bargaining process and the
formation of the contract, inadequacies that suggest a lack of a real and voluntary meeting of
the minds of the parties”).
60. See Moran v. Riverfront Diversified, Inc., 968 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011)
(noting that, in determining whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable, the
“[r]elevant considerations include the parties’ age, education, intelligence, [and] business
acumen and experience”); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156, 161 (Or. Ct. App.
2007) (noting that evidence of the parties’ unequal bargaining power was insufficient to
demonstrate that a contract was procedurally unconscionable, where there was “no evidence
that the depositors were not of ordinary experience and intelligence” (citing Best v. U.S. Nat’l
Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1987))); cf. Hollingshead v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
920 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that procedural unconscionability was not
established where plaintiff failed to present circumstances surrounding the making of the
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power and whether there was the presence or absence of meaningful
61
choice on the part of the weaker party; (4) the conspicuousness and
clarity of the contract terms and whether attention was drawn to the
62
challenged terms when the agreement was signed; and (5) whether the
party challenging the agreement was represented by counsel when the
63
agreement was signed. Although a court may ultimately determine
that a contract of adhesion is procedurally unconscionable, most state
courts have held that a contract of adhesion is not per se
64
unconscionable.
In contrast to procedural unconscionability, substantive
65
unconscionability refers to the contract’s specific terms. A contract
may be substantively unconscionable if it includes harsh, one-sided, or
66
oppressive terms.
Just as in their procedural unconscionability
agreement aside from the signatory’s advanced age).
61. See, e.g., Freedman, 988 A.2d at 85; Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan.
City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 132–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); D.R. Horton, Inc., 96 P.3d at 1162–63;
Westmoreland v. High Point Healthcare Inc., 721 S.E.2d 712, 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012);
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 866–67 (Ohio 1998).
62. See, e.g., Freedman, 988 A.2d at 86; D.R. Horton, Inc., 96 P.3d at 1162, 1164; Tillman,
655 S.E.2d at 370; Porpora, 828 N.E.2d at 1084–85; Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823
N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1177–
78, 1180 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
63. See, e.g., Porpora, 828 N.E.2d at 1084; Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24; Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at
1180; cf. Westmoreland, 721 S.E.2d at 718 (holding that an arbitration agreement was not
procedurally unconscionable where the contract “affirmatively advise[d] a party to seek legal
advice or to consult with the admissions coordinator if she [had] any questions” about the
terms of the agreement).
64. See, e.g., Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 746 (Md. 2005) (holding that “[a]
contract of adhesion is not automatically deemed per se unconscionable”); Westmoreland, 721
S.E.2d at 717 (“An imbalance in bargaining strength is one of many factors that must be
considered to determine whether there is procedural unconscionability. But bargaining
inequity alone generally cannot establish procedural unconscionability.” (internal citation
omitted) (citing Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 370)); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884
N.E.2d 12, 24 (Ohio 2008) (“To be sure, an arbitration clause in a consumer contract with
some characteristics of an adhesion contract ‘necessarily engenders more reservations than an
arbitration clause in a different setting,’ such as in a collective-bargaining agreement or a
commercial contract between two businesses. However, even a contract of adhesion is not in
all instances unconscionable per se.” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 866)).
65. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 949 N.E.2d 639, 647 (Ill. 2011); Livingston v.
Metro. Pediatrics, LLC, 227 P.3d 796, 806 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin.
Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 817 (N.M. 2011) (“Substantive unconscionability concerns the
legality and fairness of the contract terms themselves . . . .” (quoting Cordova v. World Fin.
Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2009))).
66. See Phoenix Ins. Co., 949 N.E.2d at 647; Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 132, 134; Rivera,
259 P.3d at 817 (citing Cordova, 208 P.3d 901); Westmoreland, 721 S.E.2d at 719.
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analysis, courts are ordinarily unwilling to declare terms to be per se
substantively unconscionable, instead analyzing challenged contract
67
terms in light of the individual circumstances of each case.
With respect to arbitration agreements specifically, courts disfavor
arbitration provisions that are one-sided and have the effect of
68
benefiting one party much more than the other. However, although
courts will often closely scrutinize a contract that has one-sided contract
provisions, especially in the context of consumer contracts, they do not
69
normally require that contract provisions equally benefit the parties.
Courts have also carefully weighed provisions that prevent the plaintiffs
from seeking the same remedies that would be available in court,
70
particularly if there are specific statutory rights involved.
Unreasonable or prohibitively high arbitration costs have been another
justification for finding an arbitration provision substantively
71
unconscionable.
In considering whether a contract provision is
67. See, e.g., Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 371–72; Livingston, 227 P.3d at 807.
68. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 134–35 (holding that arbitration agreement provisions,
which allowed the defendant to “unilaterally revise the arbitration rules, render the arbitrator
powerless to resolve a large class of claims, or fail to provide an adequate remedy for the
dispute,” were substantively unconscionable); Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 372–73 (holding that an
arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable in part because the agreement
exempted foreclosure actions and claims of less than $15,000, which unfairly benefited the
defendant); Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 866; Porpora, 828 N.E.2d at 1085.
69. See, e.g., Walther, 872 A.2d at 748 (holding that arbitration agreement in mortgage
agreement did not lack mutuality even though agreement allowed mortgage company to
bring foreclosure actions in court); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156, 164 (Or.
Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that “an approach that focuses on the one-sided effect of an
arbitration clause—rather than on its one-sided application—to evaluate substantive
unconscionability is most consistent with the common law in Oregon regarding
unconscionability of other kinds of contractual provisions and with state and federal policies
regarding arbitration”).
70. See, e.g., Gonski v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164, 1171–72 (Nev. 2010)
(holding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable where it impermissibly waived
most statutory protections regarding residential construction defects); Hayes v. Oakridge
Home, 886 N.E.2d 928, 930, 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 908 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio 2009);
Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1175 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
71. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–91 (2000) (observing that
“the existence of large arbitration costs” might serve as a basis for a determination that an
arbitration agreement was unenforceable); see also Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 371–72 (holding
that the arbitration agreement, which stated that the loser would bear the costs of any
arbitration lasting more than eight hours, was substantively unconscionable where the
evidence showed that the plaintiff had limited financial resources and a two-day arbitration
hearing would cost several thousand dollars); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d
940, 952 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that an arbitration agreement’s cost-sharing provision
was “sufficiently onerous to act as a deterrent to [the] plaintiffs’ vindication of their claim”);
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substantively unconscionable, Ohio courts may evaluate the challenged
72
provision’s commercial reasonableness. Finally, courts are more likely
to find arbitration agreements substantively unconscionable if the
agreements do not provide enough information about the arbitration
73
process.
III. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE REGARDING HOW STATE COURTS
APPLY THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE
As introduced supra, much has been written about how state courts
apply the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements, with
74
many scholars critical of state courts’ purportedly uneven approach.
This critique has been echoed by federal courts, especially the U.S.
75
These concerns about uneven application of the
Supreme Court.
unconscionability doctrine provide a good starting point for this longterm study and, thus, merit some further discussion.
California has drawn the most attention, in part because of empirical
76
77
research by Stephen A. Broome and Susan Randall, and in part
because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility
78
LLC. Broome’s study analyzed the unconscionability case law of the
California courts of appeal, the state’s intermediate appellate courts, for
the time period from August 27, 1982, the date of the first case adopting
a “modern” approach to the unconscionability doctrine, to January 26,
79
2006. In all, Broome analyzed a total of 160 cases, including 114 cases
in which there was an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration
cf. Westmoreland, 721 S.E.2d at 722 (determining that the trial court erred in finding an
arbitration agreement’s cost-shifting provision unconscionable where the plaintiff did not
present evidence of arbitration costs or comparisons between the costs of arbitrating versus
litigating her claims).
72. See, e.g., Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993).
73. See, e.g., Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006-Ohio-4500, ¶ 22 (Ct. App.).
74. See supra note 4.
75. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (noting
that California courts are more likely to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable than
other types of contracts).
76. See generally Broome, supra note 4.
77. See generally Randall, supra note 4.
78. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
79. Broome, supra note 4, at 44 n.33 (citing A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 121–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)). Broome defined the “modern” approach to the
unconscionability doctrine as one that requires a showing of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. See id.
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agreement and forty-six cases involving unconscionability challenges to
80
non-arbitration contract provisions.
Having done the math, Broome concluded that “unconscionability
challenges before the California appellate courts succeed with far
greater frequency when the contractual provision at issue is an
81
arbitration agreement.”
Specifically, he determined that California
courts of appeal found arbitration provisions unconscionable in fiftyeight percent of cases but only held non-arbitration contract provisions
82
unconscionable eleven percent of the time. Although Broome’s study
is useful in understanding California courts’ application of the
unconscionability doctrine, its narrow focus on one state prevents it
from contributing to a broader understanding of state courts’
unconscionability analysis.
Professor Randall took a different approach than Broome, analyzing
all states’ approaches to unconscionability in the arbitration context, but
limiting her study to a comparison of two two-year time periods, 1982 to
83
1983 and 2002 to 2003. Randall asserted that as of 2004, the date that
her article was written, “judges [found] arbitration agreements
84
unconscionable at twice the rate of non-arbitration agreements.” In
comparison, she determined that twenty years earlier, judges found
arbitration and non-arbitration contract provisions unconscionable at
85
the same rate. Specifically, Randall argued that judges found forum
selection clauses, confidentiality requirements, and punitive damages
limitations unconscionable in arbitration agreements, but they would
routinely find them unobjectionable in contracts that did not have
86
arbitration clauses.
Randall acknowledged that a “significant number” of the cases that
she relied on were decided by state and federal courts in California, but
she determined that a total of seventeen different state courts found
87
arbitration agreements unconscionable between 2002 and 2003.
80. Id. at 44–47.
81. Id. at 40.
82. Id. at 48.
83. Randall, supra note 4, at 187.
84. Id. at 186.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 194–95. Those state courts included Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. Id. at 195 n.35.
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Although Randall recognized that a number of factors could be
responsible, at least in part, for the increased number of cases involving
unconscionable arbitration agreements—such as increases in the
number of cases generally and escalating aggressiveness in the drafting
of arbitration agreements—she argued that “increased judicial
willingness to find unconscionability in arbitration agreements
suggest[ed] a latent judicial hostility to arbitration and use of
88
unconscionability contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act’s mandate.”
Like Broome’s study of the California appellate courts’
unconscionability case law, Randall’s study also makes important
contributions to a fuller understanding of how state courts apply the
unconscionability doctrine. Because Randall does not focus on just one
state, her study suggests a larger problem with the uneven application of
the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements versus other
89
types of contracts. One of the study’s limitations, however, is its very
90
narrow date range. By focusing on two such limited time spans, it is
difficult to conclude if the patterns that she observed hold true for the
long term.
Most recently, contracts scholar Charles L. Knapp conducted the
largest scale study of unconscionability cases, although his study is still
91
too cursory to come to many broader conclusions. Knapp conducted a
survey of published state and federal case law in which contract
unconscionability was an issue, covering the time period from 1990
92
through 2008. Similar to some of Randall’s observations, Knapp noted
as a general trend that the number of unconscionability cases has
increased in terms of absolute numbers since 1990, although that
increase was due for the most part to an increase in unconscionability
93
arguments related to arbitration agreements. Moreover, he noted a
significant increase in the “success” of unconscionability arguments
during that time period, due almost entirely to cases involving
94
arbitration agreements.
Echoing Broome’s conclusions, Knapp found that unconscionability
claims were more likely to succeed in the California state appellate
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 196.
See generally id.
Id. at 187.
See generally Knapp, supra note 4.
See id. at 620.
Id. at 621–23.
Id. at 622–23.
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courts, with California state cases representing over one-third, or thirtytwo out of eighty-eight, of state unconscionability cases nationwide
95
during that time period. Furthermore, most federal court decisions in
which unconscionability arguments were successful came out of
96
California federal courts or the Ninth Circuit. However, Knapp also
found that twenty-two other states’ courts, as well as federal courts
outside of the Ninth Circuit, decided in favor of parties’
97
unconscionability arguments. Although Knapp recognized that during
the early years of arbitration unconscionability jurisprudence at least
some state courts used the unconscionability doctrine to express their
suspicion of arbitration, he concluded that:
[S]uch outward shows of animosity have for the most part given
way to a more measured response, in which the lower courts
carefully attempt to identify which aspects of a particular
arbitration scheme should be viewed as so fundamentally unfair
that either the clause as a whole or those particular components
of it should be deemed unconscionable and therefore
98
unenforceable.
Because Knapp’s research encompasses the largest number of states
over the longest period of time of any study to this point, it adds to our
understanding of state courts’ application of unconscionability to
arbitration agreements. However, one problematic aspect of Knapp’s
study is that he divided the case law, whether involving arbitration
agreements or non-arbitration contract clauses, into only two basic
categories: “those in which the claim failed completely and those in
99
which it succeeded to some extent—actually or at least potentially.”
Thus, data from cases in which the court found the challenged provision
unconscionable was lumped in with cases where the appellate court
simply determined that the trial court should have considered a party’s
unconscionability argument and remanded for further consideration of
100
that issue. In cases in which the appellate court remanded to the trial
95. Id. at 623–24.
96. Id. at 624–25.
97. Id. at 624.
98. Id. at 626–27.
99. Id. at 621.
100. Id. at 621 n.62 (“Thus the category of successful cases for the purpose of this
discussion would include not only cases in which a contract was completely invalidated or a
particular term was struck down, but also those in which an appellate court merely held that a
lower court had wrongly refused to consider a potentially valid claim of unconscionability.”).
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court for further unconscionability analysis, however, it is not possible to
determine whether the party asserting unconscionability was actually
successful upon remand.
Thus, categorizing remand cases as
“successful” may artificially inflate this category. Instead, in many cases
it may be more appropriate to view a remand as a signal that the trial
court failed to follow appropriate procedural requirements for a proper
analysis of a party’s unconscionability argument. To deal with this
uncertainty, the instant study treats these remand cases as a separate,
third category of case law.
Finally, although taking a national approach like Randall and Knapp
did in their studies provides a perspective of how courts generally apply
the unconscionability doctrine, the instant study provides less
understanding of how individual states have approached this issue and
the extent to which individual states follow broader national trends.
Therefore, although this Article draws some broader conclusions about
how state courts apply the unconscionability doctrine to both arbitration
and non-arbitration contract provisions, it also seeks a greater
understanding of the patterns that exist by comparing individual states’
approaches to the doctrine.
IV. ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF UNCONSCIONABILITY ANALYSIS:
STATE COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY
DOCTRINE
With the previous scholarly work as a foundation for my research
and a curiosity about whether the observed trends held true across
longer time periods when analyzing individual states’ unconscionability
case law, I set out on this research project. As discussed infra, the
101
numbers proved somewhat surprising. Although there were certainly a
significant number of unconscionability cases that concerned arbitration
agreements—in fact, approximately fifty percent of all unconscionability
cases during the period of this study—that number did not tell the entire
102
story.
My questions about this issue were not fully answered by the
fact that, collectively, state courts were slightly more likely to find
arbitration agreements unconscionable than other types of contract
provisions. Instead, when the numbers are broken down, a much more
complex picture of state courts’ application of the unconscionability
doctrine begins to emerge. That complexity demonstrates that many
101. See infra Part IV.A.
102. See infra Part IV.A.
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assumptions—of both courts and scholars—about state courts’ use of
the unconscionability doctrine need reconsideration.
A. The Big Picture: The Overall Numbers
In order to obtain a full understanding of the state courts’
application of the unconscionability doctrine, this study first analyzes
the breakdown of unconscionability cases in these twenty states by year,
separated into cases involving arbitration agreements and those that
103
involve challenges to other types of contract provisions. After gaining
a greater understanding of the patterns that exist within
unconscionability case law in general, this study then explores the
success rates for these unconscionability challenges. Throughout, this
subsection remains focused on the more general national trends
extrapolated from these cases. In further subsections, those trends will
be further broken down by state.
1. Unconscionability Cases in General: The Breakdown Between
Arbitration and Non-Arbitration Cases
Within the twenty states surveyed for this study, the appellate courts
engaged in unconscionability analysis in 460 cases between 1980 and
104
2012.
Of those cases, 231, or 50.22%, involved non-arbitration
105
Additionally, 237 cases, or 51.52%, involved
contract provisions.
106
arbitration agreements.
Over the course of more than thirty years,
therefore, parties have sought to challenge arbitration and nonarbitration contracts on fairly equal footing.
Of course, these numbers do not tell the entire story. First, some
scholars argue that the number of arbitration cases demonstrates that
parties are more likely to use the unconscionability doctrine in an
attempt to challenge arbitration agreements than other types of
contracts, and to a certain extent, at least in the last ten to fifteen years,
107
this assertion is correct.
In the non-arbitration context, there are
103. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 1.
104. See infra Table 1.
105. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graph 1.
106. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graph 1. Eight cases involved both arbitration and
non-arbitration provisions and have been counted in each category, explaining why there
appear to be more than 100% of the cases being accounted for. See infra note 264.
107. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 4, at 194 (“Litigants rarely invoked unconscionability
prior to the increase in the use of arbitration agreements. . . . However, as the use of
arbitration agreements has increased, claims of unconscionability have also increased . . . .”).
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numerous different types of contract clauses at issue, such as provisions
108
109
that limit damages, limit liability, or provide for liquidated damages
110
in the event of a breach. If the non-arbitration cases were separated
by type of contract provision at issue, the resulting numbers would
highlight the current legal interest in arbitration, to be sure. But it is
also important to note that the unconscionability doctrine has been
around for a very long time, and thus much of the case law in which
parties used the doctrine to challenge other types of contracts would
111
therefore come from the decades prior to 1980.
Thus, by focusing
solely on the case law since 1980, it is possible that this study, as well as
the work of other scholars, has made the arbitration issue appear more
significant than it would be if put into a long-term context. In fact, it is
likely that the use of the unconscionability doctrine has gone through
cycles of popularity—at least in terms of its use in pleadings, if not in
case outcomes. It is also important to keep in mind the larger trend in
litigation—that is, there have been an ever-increasing number of cases
112
in litigation over time.
Thus, adjusting for “inflation” of case filings
more generally, the number of unconscionability cases, whether
involving arbitration clauses or not, may not be as significant as they
appear on the surface—but, that’s a potential topic for another article.

108. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 417 N.E.2d
131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Leet v. Totah, 620 A.2d 1372 (Md. 1993); Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v.
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 537 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio 1989); Scott Reising Jewelers, Inc. v. ADT
Sec. Servs., Inc., Nos. C-050322, C-050329, 2006 WL 6576746 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2006);
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Nos. 14799, 14803, 1995 WL 461316 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 4, 1995).
109. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1986); Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Guardtronic, Inc., 64 S.W.3d 779 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002); Reuben H.
Donnelley Corp. v. Krasny Supply Co., 592 N.E.2d 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Fireman’s Fund Am.
Ins. Cos., 417 N.E.2d 131; Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505
(Mo. 2001) (en banc); Scott Reising Jewelers, Inc., 2006 WL 6576746; Hurst v. Enter. Title
Agency, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
110. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Architectural Mgmt., Inc., 550 N.E.2d 1110, 1115
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Repair Masters Constr., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009); Reichert v. Rubloff Hammond, L.L.C., 645 N.W.2d 519, 527 (Neb. 2002); Buckingham
v. Ryan, 953 P.2d 33, 36, 38 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a liquidated damages
provision in a real estate contract was not unconscionable).
111. See Knapp, supra note 4, at 612–13.
112. See, e.g., Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts
and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473, 474–
77 (2009) (describing the dramatic increase in the number of cases filed in the federal courts
over the preceding four decades).
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Moreover, the unconscionability case law numbers—whether
involving arbitration agreements or non-arbitration provisions, did not
remain constant for the duration of the time period of the instant study.
Parties rarely used the unconscionability doctrine to challenge
113
arbitration agreements in the 1980s,
and the number of
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements still remained
114
relatively low throughout the 1990s. Although the number remained
115
relatively low in 2000 and 2001, the number of unconscionability cases
involving arbitration agreements climbed steadily between 2002 and
116
2008. After the peak in 2008, the number of unconscionability cases
involving arbitration agreements declined somewhat and appears to
117
have stabilized, at least for now.
In contrast, the numbers for non-arbitration unconscionability cases
118
have a different pattern, basically resembling a wave. Throughout the
1980s and 1990s, the number of non-arbitration unconscionability cases
remained relatively constant, but reached their highest points in 1981,
119
1987, and 1999. The numbers stayed consistent for the years of 2000
through 2004, before increasing again to ten cases each year in 2005 and
120
2006. After declining a small amount in 2007 and more significantly in
2008, the number of non-arbitration unconscionability cases hit their
113. See infra Table 1. Among the twenty states included in the survey, there was only
one unconscionability case involving an arbitration agreement each year for the years 1983,
1986, 1987, and 1988, and only two arbitration cases in 1989. See infra Table 1. There were
no unconscionability cases involving arbitration agreements between the years 1980 and 1982
or in 1984 and 1985. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4.
114. See infra Table 1. Although there were more unconscionability cases involving
arbitration agreements in the 1990s than in the 1980s, the numbers still remained relatively
low. See infra Table 1. There was one arbitration case each in 1994 and 1995, three cases in
1993, four cases in 1991, 1992, and 1999, and five cases in 1998. See infra Table 1. However,
there were no unconscionability cases involving arbitration agreements in 1990, 1996, and
1997. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4.
115. See infra Table 1. There were six unconscionability cases involving arbitration
agreements in 2000 and four cases in 2001. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graph 4.
116. See infra Table 1. The arbitration unconscionability case numbers for the time
period from 2002 through 2008 are as follows: thirteen cases in 2002, eleven in 2003, twentytwo in 2004, nineteen in 2005, twenty-two in 2006, twenty-seven in 2007, and twenty-seven in
2008. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4.
117. See infra Table 1; Graphs 1, 4. There were seventeen unconscionability cases
involving arbitration agreements in 2009, fourteen in 2010, fifteen in 2011, and twelve in 2012.
See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4.
118. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3.
119. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3. There were ten non-arbitration
unconscionability cases in 1981, eleven in 1987, and ten in 1999. See infra Table 1.
120. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3.
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highest peak in 2009 and 2010 with fourteen and thirteen cases,
121
respectively.
2. Unconscionability Found: General Comparisons Between Arbitration
and Non-Arbitration Cases
Having generally surveyed the lay of the unconscionability landscape
over the past thirty-two years, let us now focus on the central issues
addressed by this Article. How often do state courts find contract
provisions to be unconscionable, and to what extent are they more likely
to find arbitration agreements unconscionable than other types of
contracts? In reality, the answer to that question is not as simple as it
might seem on the surface. Although the overall numbers suggest that
state courts have been more inclined to find arbitration agreements
unconscionable than other types of contracts, the actual numbers do not
demonstrate the type of dramatic contrast that the scholarly literature
122
suggests should exist, and there are also some surprising outcomes.
In all, courts found contract provisions, whether involving
arbitration or not, unconscionable in approximately twenty-three
123
percent of cases. That number further breaks down as follows. Out of
the 237 arbitration unconscionability cases surveyed, state courts
determined that arbitration clauses were unconscionable and refused to
enforce the arbitration agreements, either in whole or in part, in sixty
124
cases.
Thus, in twenty-five percent of arbitration cases, the courts
125
determined that the challenged clause was unconscionable.
In
contrast, courts found unconscionability in forty-six out of 231 non126
arbitration cases, amounting to twenty percent of those cases. These
numbers demonstrate that although there is a difference between the
percentage of arbitration agreements with unconscionable provisions
and the percentage of non-arbitration provisions found unconscionable,
the difference is not huge and, in fact, may not be considered that
significant.
There was one major surprise in the statistics, however. Although
there was not a significant difference over time in the percentage of
121. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3.
122. Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges,
26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 9–10 (2011).
123. See infra Table 1.
124. See infra Table 1.
125. See infra Table 1.
126. See infra Table 1.

LANDRUM-FINAL (7-10-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

780

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/10/2014 10:35 AM

[97:3

cases found unconscionable, there was a significant difference in the
number of cases in which appellate courts considered the
unconscionability issue for arbitration cases but remanded to the trial
127
court for further unconscionability analysis.
Since 1980, the state
appellate courts remanded only thirteen non-arbitration cases to the
trial courts for further unconscionability analysis, amounting to
128
approximately 5.63% of all non-arbitration unconscionability cases. In
contrast, appellate courts remanded thirty-five arbitration cases to the
trial court for further unconscionability analysis, or just under fifteen
129
percent of arbitration-related unconscionability cases. These numbers
suggest that although appellate courts have historically applied the
unconscionability doctrine fairly consistently to both arbitration and
non-arbitration agreements, trial courts have sometimes struggled with
how they should approach this legal concept. Just because appellate
courts remand more arbitration cases to the trial court for further
unconscionability analysis, however, does not necessarily support a
conclusion that the courts are less favorable to arbitration agreements.
These cases are almost never appealed a second time, and, therefore, it
130
is unknown what the outcome was in the trial court after remand.
B. Breaking it Down: Reoccurring Themes Within the Overall Numbers
The overall numbers do not tell the entire story, however, and, in
some ways, are actually misleading. As discussed below, there is
significant variation in how individual states’ unconscionability numbers
play out. When the numbers are broken down state by state, it becomes
clear that the overall numbers do not represent how many states
approach the unconscionability doctrine, whether applied to arbitration
agreements or other types of contracts. States fall at different points
along the unconscionability spectrum, with some states’ courts rarely, if
ever, finding any contract clauses unconscionable and, at the opposite
end, other states’ courts appearing to be very sympathetic to
unconscionability defenses regardless of the type of contract. Although
127. See infra Table 1; Graph 5.
128. See infra Table 1.
129. See infra Table 1.
130. This uncertainty is one reason why I disagree with Professor Knapp’s inclusion of
this category of cases with the cases in which courts found contract provisions to be
unconscionable. See Knapp, supra note 4, at 621 & n.62. Professor Knapp describes this
category of cases as the “potentially” successful category, but, as noted previously, the
outcome upon remand is merely speculative. See id.

LANDRUM-FINAL (7-10-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/10/2014 10:35 AM

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

781

four states are definitely more likely to find an arbitration agreement
unconscionable than other types of contracts, other states are more
moderate in their approaches to unconscionability and fall somewhere
in the middle of the spectrum.
1. The “Conservative” Approach: A Reluctance to Embrace the
Unconscionability Doctrine
On the one end of the unconscionability spectrum are states that
have rarely found any contract provision, whether an arbitration
provision or some other type of clause, unconscionable. This Article
will refer to this approach as the “conservative” approach to the
unconscionability doctrine. For obvious reasons, states that are
conservative in their approach to unconscionability provide little
support for the theory that courts treat arbitration agreements
differently with respect to unconscionability analysis than they do other
types of contract provisions. Out of the twenty states that I analyzed for
purposes of this study, I have classified ten as falling into the
conservative category: Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
131
South Carolina. Although the appellate courts in some of these states
may occasionally find a contract provision unconscionable, it is certainly
not a common phenomenon.
A general summary of the unconscionability case law from these ten
states during the time period from 1980 to 2012 provides a useful picture
of the status of the unconscionability doctrine in these states. As a
preliminary matter, it is important to note that the courts in all of the
conservative-approach states have recognized unconscionability as a
132
possible contract defense. However, despite that recognition, during
131. See infra Table 2.
132. See, e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 991–92 (Colo. 1986); Walther v.
Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 743 (Md. 2005); Int’l Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Franz, 534 N.W.2d 261,
269 (Minn. 1995); Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d 776, 799–800 (Neb. 2006); Pittsfield
Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430 A.2d 638, 639 (N.H. 1981); Tillman v. Commercial
Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 369–70 (N.C. 2008); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc.,
152 P.3d 940, 948 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., 748 A.2d 261, 269 (R.I.
2000); Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 365 (S.C. 2001). Although the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has never applied Maine unconscionability law to a contract
provision, the Kennebec County Superior Court-Augusta has held contract provisions to be
unconscionable under Maine law. See, e.g., Newcombe v. Mooers, No. CV-99-043, 2000 WL
33675662, at *2 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000). In Barrett v. McDonald Investments, Inc., 870
A.2d 146 (Me. 2005), the concurrence contained a detailed discussion of the unconscionability
doctrine and stated that the contract at issue appeared to be unconscionable. Id. at 155-56
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the time period of the instant study, four of the ten states had no cases in
which appellate courts considered whether the unconscionability
133
134
doctrine could challenge an arbitration agreement: Maine, Nebraska,
135
136
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. During the same time period,
appellate courts in three other states—Maryland, Colorado, and
Minnesota—considered the unconscionability doctrine in the context of
arbitration agreements but found no arbitration provisions
137
unconscionable.
Furthermore, since 1980, the appellate courts in
(Alexander, J., concurring). I have not included Barrett in this study because neither the trial
court nor the majority opinion identified unconscionability as an issue in the case or described
any unconscionability arguments raised by the parties. See generally Barrett v. McDonald
Investments, Inc., No. CV-03-128, 2003 WL 25794014 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2003); Barrett,
870 A.2d 146.
133. See infra Table 2. Since 1980, Maine has not had a single case in which the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court applied Maine unconscionability law. See infra Table 2.
134. See infra Table 2. Since 1980, Nebraska appellate courts have considered the
unconscionability doctrine in five cases, all involving non-arbitration clauses. See infra Table
2. Out of those five cases, the Nebraska Court of Appeals found unconscionability in one
situation. See Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577, 591 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992). That
case involved a commercial contract. See id. at 589–90.
135. See infra Table 2. Like Nebraska, New Hampshire has had five appellate cases
involving the unconscionability doctrine since 1980, all involving non-arbitration contracts.
See infra Table 2. New Hampshire also only had one case in which the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found unconscionability, a commercial contract case. See infra Table 2; see
also Pittsfield Weaving Co., 430 A.2d 638. There has only been one appellate case in which a
New Hampshire court considered the unconscionability doctrine since 1986. See infra Table
2; see also Pope v. Lee, 879 A.2d 735 (N.H. 2005).
136. See infra Table 2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has only considered two
unconscionability cases since 1980. See infra Table 2. See generally Ruzzo, 748 A.2d 261;
Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563 (R.I. 1987). The court held that the
challenged provision was unconscionable in one of those cases. See Ruzzo, 748 A.2d at 269.
Although that amounts to a fifty percent success rate for unconscionability arguments, I have
classified Rhode Island as a conservative state because it has only held a contract provision to
be unconscionable on that one occasion. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not
explicitly discussed procedural and substantive unconscionability as part of its
unconscionability analysis. See Ostalkiewicz, 520 A.2d at 565–66 (discussing several factors in
its determination that the terms of a burglary alarm contract were not unconscionable);
Ruzzo, 748 A.2d at 269 (holding that “in Rhode Island, a disclaimer for personal injuries
arising from the use of a consumer product introduced into the stream of commerce [was per
se] ‘unconscionable” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
137. See infra Table 2. Since 1980, Maryland appellate courts have analyzed whether
arbitration provisions were unconscionable on five occasions but have never found a
challenged arbitration provision to be unconscionable. See infra Table 2. Colorado has
analyzed whether challenged contract provisions were unconscionable on nine occasions, with
two of the nine cases involving arbitration agreements. See infra Table 2. Although the
Colorado appellate courts have never found an arbitration agreement to be unconscionable,
on one occasion a Colorado appellate court did remand a case back to the trial court for
further proceedings related to an unconscionability argument. See infra Table 2; see also
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Maine and Maryland have not found any contract provision to be
138
unconscionable.
Although Minnesota courts have considered the
unconscionability doctrine on twenty-two occasions, far surpassing the
unconscionability case law of the other conservative states, the
Minnesota appellate courts have only found a contract provision
139
unconscionable on two occasions, less than ten percent of the time.
Moreover, even among state courts that have found contract
provisions to be unconscionable, it has often been many years since their
last successful unconscionability case.
For example, Minnesota
appellate courts last found a contract provision unconscionable in
140
1991, and the last time that a Nebraska appellate court found a
141
contract clause to be unconscionable was in 1992. New Hampshire’s
142
last successful unconscionability case was in 1981, and a Colorado
appellate court last found a challenged contract provision
143
Rhode Island’s last successful
unconscionable in 1986.
144
unconscionability case was in 2000. These statistics show that even as
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements became more
common on the national level in the last decade or so, the trend has not
meant that those unconscionability defenses have become more
successful in all states.
Although North Carolina and South Carolina appellate courts have
each found arbitration agreements unconscionable, their treatment of
arbitration agreements, and their application of the unconscionability
Estate of Grimm v. Evans, 251 P.3d 574, 576, 578 (Colo. App. 2010). Although Minnesota
appellate courts have considered whether contract provisions were unconscionable on
twenty-two occasions, only one of those cases involved an arbitration agreement, and the
court determined that the arbitration provision at issue in that case was not unconscionable.
See infra Table 2; see also Ottman v. Fadden, 575 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that arbitration provision in employment contract was not unconscionable).
138. See infra Table 2.
139. See infra Table 2; see also Glarner v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591, 595–96, 598
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk, 353 N.W.2d 600, 604–05
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that contract’s remedy provisions were unconscionable),
rev’d, 373 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1985). The Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed the
appellate court’s unconscionability determination in Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of
Nashwauk. See Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk, 373 N.W.2d 744, 753, 756 (Minn.
1985).
140. See generally Glarner, 465 N.W.2d 591.
141. See generally Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992).
142. See generally Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430 A.2d 638 (N.H.
1981).
143. See generally Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986).
144. See generally Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., 748 A.2d 261 (R.I. 2000).
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doctrine more generally, is still much more conservative than the
145
average.
For example, South Carolina appellate courts have
considered the unconscionability doctrine in nine cases, ultimately
finding the challenged contract provisions unconscionable in one case,
which happened to be a case in which an arbitration agreement was at
146
issue.
Thus, South Carolina appellate courts have found a contract
147
provision unconscionable in 11.1% of its total unconscionability cases.
Even if one only considers South Carolina’s arbitration
unconscionability cases, South Carolina appellate courts found the
challenged arbitration provisions to be unconscionable in one out of
seven cases, or only 14.29% of the time, which is still far below the
average—whether considering arbitration agreements, non-arbitration
148
contract provisions, or both—among the states in this study.
North Carolina courts have had a similar approach to those of South
Carolina in this respect. Since 1980, North Carolina appellate courts
149
have considered unconscionability arguments in twenty cases. In only
one of those cases, which involved an arbitration agreement, the North
Carolina appellate courts found the challenged provision to be
unconscionable, amounting to only five percent of the unconscionability
150
cases.
Even if considering arbitration agreements, however, North
Carolina appellate courts have only found challenged contract
provisions to be unconscionable in one out of eight cases, or 12.5% of
151
the time, once again well below the average for states in this study.
145. See generally infra Tables 1–2; see also supra text accompanying notes 123–26.
146. See infra Table 2; see also Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663,
673 (S.C. 2007).
147. See infra Table 2.
148. See infra Tables 1–2; see also supra text accompanying notes 125–26. Interestingly,
South Carolina has also considered whether a clause in an arbitration agreement banning
class action arbitration is unconscionable. See Herron v. Century BMW, 693 S.E.2d 394 (S.C.
2010), vacated sub nom. Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Watts, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011) (mem.), reinstated
by 719 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. 2011). The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the
challenged provision was not unconscionable but still refused to enforce it on public policy
grounds. See id. at 398–400. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings in light of AT&T Mobility.
See Sonic Auto., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2872, reh’g sub. nom. Herron v. Century BMW, 719 S.E.2d
640 (S.C. 2011).
149. See infra Table 2.
150. See infra Table 2; see also Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d
362, 373 (N.C. 2008).
151. See infra Table 2; see also supra text accompanying note 125. On one other
occasion, the North Carolina Appellate Court considered the unconscionability doctrine but
ultimately remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings related to the
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The final state that falls within the conservative category is Oregon.
Oregon courts applied the unconscionability doctrine to contracts in
152
nine cases between 1980 and 2012. However, all but one of those cases
153
were decided between 2005 and 2012. Two of the cases involved non154
arbitration contract clauses, and the Oregon courts found one of those
155
challenged contracts unconscionable. The other seven cases involved
156
Oregon courts only held challenged
arbitration agreements.
arbitration clauses unconscionable in one of the seven cases, or 14.29%
157
of the time.
Although Oregon’s overall unconscionability numbers,
22.22% unconscionable, put the state more in keeping with the
unconscionability numbers for all twenty states combined, this Article
categorizes Oregon as one of the conservative states because it has not
been as sympathetic to unconscionability defenses in the arbitration
context and has not found any contract provision unconscionable since
158
2007.
2. The Opposite Extreme: States that Appear to Have Embraced the
Unconscionability Doctrine in Both Arbitration and Non-Arbitration
Contexts
On the opposite side of the spectrum are the states that appear to
have embraced the unconscionability doctrine in both the arbitration
and non-arbitration context. Admittedly, the number of states that fall
159
into this category is much smaller. Out of the twenty states analyzed
unconscionability issue. See Kucan v. Advance Am., 660 S.E.2d 98, 103–04 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
152. See infra Table 2.
153. The nine Oregon unconscionability cases are Hatkoff v. Portland Adventist Med.
Ctr., 287 P.3d 1113 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); Livingston v. Metro. Pediatrics, LLC, 227 P.3d 796
(Or. Ct. App. 2010); Hays Grp., Inc. v. Biege, 193 P.3d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Sprague v.
Quality Rests. Nw., Inc., 162 P.3d 331 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc.,
156 P.3d 156 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct.
App. 2007); DEX Media, Inc. v. Nat’l Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 150 P.3d 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 2007);
Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 125 P.3d 814 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); and Or. Bank v. Nautilus Crane
& Equip. Corp., 683 P.2d 95 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
154. See generally Carey, 125 P.3d 814; Or. Bank, 683 P.2d 95.
155. Carey, 125 P.3d at 831–32.
156. See generally Livingston, 227 P.3d 796; Hays Grp., Inc., 193 P.3d 1028; Sprague, 162
P.3d 331; Motsinger, 156 P.3d 156; Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d 940; DEX Media, Inc., 150 P.3d
1093.
157. See Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 948–53.
158. Oregon courts last held a contract provision unconscionable in Vasquez-Lopez v.
Beneficial Or., Inc., a case involving an arbitration agreement. See generally id.
159. See infra Table 3.
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for purposes of this study, three states’ appellate courts have shown a
significant tendency to be sympathetic to unconscionability defenses:
160
Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont. Although the courts in these states
have found arbitration agreements to be unconscionable, they have
161
often also found non-arbitration provisions to be unconscionable. In
fact, the Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont appellate courts have found
challenged contract provisions to be unconscionable in almost fifty
162
percent of the unconscionability cases argued before them.
Specifically, the Alaska Supreme Court has considered
unconscionability arguments in eleven cases since 1980, three of which
involved arbitration agreements and eight of which involved non163
arbitration contract provisions.
Of those eleven cases, the court has
found challenged contract provisions to be unconscionable on five
164
occasions, or in approximately forty-five percent of cases.
One of
165
these five cases involved an arbitration agreement, but the other four
166
involved non-arbitration provisions.
Arkansas appellate courts have
also applied the unconscionability doctrine in eleven cases since 1980
and have found challenged provisions to be unconscionable in five of
167
those cases, or approximately forty-five percent of the time. Just like
the breakdown in Alaska, one of the five unconscionable cases in
168
Arkansas involved an arbitration agreement, and the other four
169
involved non-arbitration contract provisions.
Finally, the Vermont
160. See infra Table 3.
161. See infra Table 3.
162. See infra Table 3.
163. See infra Table 3.
164. See infra Table 3.
165. See infra Table 3; see also Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska
2009)
166. See infra Table 3; see also Pierce v. Catalina Yachts, Inc., 2 P.3d 618 (Alaska 2000);
Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1990); Municipality of Anchorage v.
Locker, 723 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1986); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986).
Although the Alaska Supreme Court has historically found contract provisions
unconscionable in a large percentage of cases, it may be worth noting that the only case in
which the Alaska Supreme Court has found a contract provision unconscionable since 2000
was the 2009 arbitration case. See Gibson, 205 P.3d at 1098.
167. See infra Table 3.
168. See infra Table 3; see also Waverly-Ark., Inc. v. Keener, No. CA 07-524, 2008 WL
316149, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008). This is actually the only case that I found in which
the Arkansas appellate courts have considered whether an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable. See id.
169. See infra Table 3; see also Criner v. Reddell, 2011 Ark. App. 661; Garrett v. Fite,
2009 Ark. App. 869; General Elec. Capital Corp. v. McKiever, No. CA98-581, 1999 WL 96029
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Supreme Court has found contract provisions unconscionable in three
out of six cases, or fifty percent of the cases in which the Court has
170
applied the unconscionability doctrine.
Out of the three cases in
which unconscionability was found, one case involved both arbitration
171
and non-arbitration unconscionable provisions, and the other two
172
cases involved non-arbitration contract provisions.
Although appellate courts in Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont have
only had limited opportunities to consider unconscionability arguments
since 1980, the outcomes of those cases demonstrate that these states’
courts are much more open to an unconscionability defense than the
173
conservative states discussed supra. Moreover, these states appear just
as likely, if not more so, to find a non-arbitration contract
unconscionable as they are to apply that doctrine to arbitration
174
agreements.
Although Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont appellate
courts have embraced the unconscionability doctrine, the outcomes in
these states’ cases do not support the conclusion that state courts are
more likely to use unconscionability to invalidate arbitration agreements
than other types of contracts.
3. States with Appellate Courts that Are Only Sympathetic to
Unconscionability Arguments in the Arbitration Context
In an additional four states—Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Illinois—the appellate courts also appear to be very sympathetic to
unconscionability arguments, but only if the challenged provision is part
175
of an arbitration agreement.
However, if the challenged contract
provision is not related to arbitration, these courts rarely, if ever, find
176
the challenged provision unconscionable. Thus, these states appear to
illustrate exactly the type of concern that the U.S. Supreme Court, as
well as many legal scholars, have expressed regarding state courts’

(Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1999); Associated Press v. S. Ark. Radio Co., 809 S.W.2d 695 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1991).
170. See infra Table 3.
171. See infra Table 3; see also Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1054 (Vt. 2011).
172. See infra Table 3; see also Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143 (Vt. 1988); Val
Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987).
173. Compare infra Table 2, with infra Table 3. See supra Part IV.B.1–2.
174. See infra Table 3.
175. See infra Table 4.
176. See infra Table 4.
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application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration
177
agreements.
On the surface, Missouri would appear to fall into the previous
category of states, as Missouri has found challenged contract provisions
unconscionable in twelve out of twenty-four cases, or fifty percent of the
178
time.
However, the majority of the contract provisions found
179
unconscionable by Missouri courts were arbitration provisions.
Specifically, out of the thirteen arbitration-related cases in which
Missouri courts considered an unconscionability defense, ten, or
180
approximately seventy-seven percent, were found unconscionable. In
contrast, Missouri courts only found non-arbitration contract clauses
unconscionable in two out of eleven cases, or eighteen percent of the
181
time.
Although Missouri courts have found challenged arbitration
clauses unconscionable in the majority of cases, they often sever the
unconscionable provision and enforce the remainder of the arbitration
182
183
agreement.
It is also worth noting that four of the Missouri cases
177. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
178. See infra Table 4.
179. See infra Table 4.
180. See infra Table 4. The ten cases in which arbitration agreements were held
unconscionable include Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 496 (Mo. 2012) (en banc);
Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 24 (Mo. 2010) (en banc), vacated, 131 S. Ct.
2875 (2011) (mem.); Ruhl v. Lee’s Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139–40 (Mo. 2010);
Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011);
Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Woods v. QC
Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194
S.W.3d 853, 861 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C. v. Reynolds, 151 S.W.3d 868, 876 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2004); Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). Missouri
courts found that challenged arbitration provisions were not unconscionable in only two
cases: Grossman v. Thoroughbred Ford, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); and
Kan. City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
Despite the fact that the Brewer decisions involve the same parties and legal issues, I have
included both decisions because they are technically different court decisions. See generally
Brewer, 364 S.W.3d 486; Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18. Despite these numbers, Professor Michael
A. Wolff, a former judge on the Missouri Supreme Court, asserts that “Missouri law is not
hostile to mandatory arbitration.” Michael A. Wolff, Is There Life After Concepcion? State
Courts, State Law, and the Mandate of Arbitration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1269, 1269 n.*, 1275
(2012).
181. See infra Table 4. The two cases in which Missouri courts found non-arbitration
contract provisions unconscionable are Repair Masters Constr., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854,
859 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); and Oldham’s Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177, 183
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
182. See, e.g., Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 99–100; Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C., 151 S.W.3d at
875 n.5; Swain, 128 S.W.3d at 109.
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involving unconscionable arbitration provisions were cases in which the
Missouri courts specifically determined that provisions barring class
184
action arbitration were unconscionable. In fact, in one of those cases,
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the Missouri Supreme Court’s unconscionability determination and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of the U.S. Supreme
185
Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.
Similar to the outcome in Missouri appellate courts, the numbers
demonstrate that New Mexico appellate courts are more sympathetic to
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements than to other
186
types of contract provisions.
Between 1980 and 2011, New Mexico
courts considered an unconscionability defense in contract cases on
187
fifteen occasions.
Six of those cases involved challenges to nonarbitration contract provisions, but none of those contracts were found
188
unconscionable. In contrast, the New Mexico courts found arbitration
provisions unconscionable in seven out of nine cases, or approximately
189
seventy-eight percent of the time. Further, in two of those cases, the
183. See generally Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18; Ruhl, 322 S.W.3d 136; Shaffer, 300 S.W.3d 556;
Woods, 280 S.W.3d 90. But see Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 507 (Mo.
2012) (en banc) (holding, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility
LLC, that the trial court erred by determining that a class action waiver in a consumer
arbitration agreement was unconscionable). The U.S. Supreme Court also remanded
Missouri Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer to the Missouri Supreme Court, in light of AT&T
Mobility LLC. See Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.). Upon
remand, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the class action waiver was not
unconscionable, but, taken as a whole, the arbitration agreement was still unconscionable.
Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 488, 495.
184. See generally Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18; Ruhl, 322 S.W.3d 136; Shaffer, 300 S.W.3d 556;
Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 99.
185. Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.), vacating Brewer, 323
S.W.3d 18. In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC, it is unclear
whether Missouri courts will continue to invalidate arbitration provisions at the same rate as
they have done in recent years. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011);
see also infra Table 4. However, that decision does not mean that Missouri courts do not still
use the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitration provisions. See generally Brewer,
364 S.W.3d 486; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1745–46; supra note 183.
186. See infra Table 4.
187. See infra Table 4.
188. See infra Table 4.
189. See infra Table 4. The seven cases in which New Mexico courts found arbitration
agreements unconscionable are Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 819 (N.M.
2011); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 912 (N.M. 2009); Fiser v. Dell
Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1222 (N.M. 2008); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
68 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2003); Clay v. N.M. Title Loans, Inc., 288 P.3d 888, 901 (N.M. Ct. App.
2012); Coulter v. Laurel View Healthcare, No. 30,249, 2012 WL 4434366, at *2 (N.M. Ct. App.
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New Mexico Supreme Court determined that provisions barring class
190
action arbitration were unconscionable. It is also worth noting that all
of the non-arbitration cases were decided in 1998 or earlier, and all of
191
the arbitration cases were decided between 1999 and 2012.
Accordingly, for more than a decade, the use of the unconscionability
doctrine has been solely focused on challenging arbitration agreements,
a trend that is not surprising considering its success in New Mexico
192
appellate courts during that time period.
Although Nevada courts are not as sympathetic to unconscionability
challenges to arbitration agreements as Missouri and New Mexico,
Nevada unconscionability outcomes still raise the same concerns about
uneven unconscionability outcomes as those other states do. Since 1980,
the Nevada Supreme Court has considered an unconscionability
193
contract defense on nine occasions.
Seven of those cases involved
arbitration agreements, and all three cases in which the court found
194
unconscionability involved arbitration clauses.
Thus, Nevada courts
have found challenged arbitration agreements unconscionable fortythree percent of the time, a percentage far above the average for this
195
study.
As discussed supra, however, in its most recent two
unconscionability cases, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
Federal Medicare Act preempted Nevada contract law, and, therefore,
the challenged contract provisions in those two cases were not
Aug. 17, 2012); and Felts v. CLK Mgmt., Inc., 254 P.3d 124, 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
190. See Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1221–22; Felts, 254 P.3d at 137–39.
191. Rivera, 259 P.3d 803 (2011, arbitration); Cordova, 208 P.3d 901 (2009, arbitration);
Fiser, 188 P.3d 1215 (2008, arbitration); Padilla, 68 P.3d 901 (2003, arbitration); Guthmann v.
La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675 (N.M. 1985) (non-arbitration); Manzano Ind. v. Mathis, 678 P.2d
1179 (N.M. 1984) (non-arbitration); Smith v. Price’s Creameries, 650 P.2d 825 (N.M. 1982)
(non-arbitration); Clay, 288 P.3d 888 (2012, arbitration); Coulter, 2012 WL 4434366 (2012,
arbitration); Felts, 254 P.3d 124 (2011, arbitration); Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good
Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (arbitration); Monette v. Tinsley, 975
P.2d 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (arbitration); Buckingham v. Ryan, 953 P.2d 33 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1997) (non-arbitration); Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 943 P.2d 560 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1997) (non-arbitration); Bowlin’s, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 662 P.2d 661 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983) (non-arbitration).
192. See infra Tables 1, 4.
193. See infra Table 4.
194. See infra Table 4. The three cases in which the Nevada Supreme Court found
arbitration agreements unconscionable include Gonski v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164,
1173 (Nev. 2010); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1165 (Nev. 2004); and Burch v.
Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 49 P.3d 647, 651 (Nev. 2002).
195. See infra Table 4; see also the discussion of this study’s combined unconscionability
numbers for all twenty states, supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
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196

unconscionable. It is also worth noting that, between 1980 and 2001,
Nevada only had one case analyzing unconscionability—one that did not
197
involve an arbitration agreement. The other eight cases were decided
198
Thus, Nevada’s unconscionability case law follows a
since 2001.
199
similar trend to that of New Mexico in this respect.
The last state that fits in this category is Illinois. Once again, Illinois
appellate courts are not as extreme as Missouri and New Mexico courts
in their application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration
agreements, but there is still a significant difference between Illinois
courts’ favorable unconscionability determinations in the arbitration
200
context versus other types of contracts.
Specifically, Illinois courts
have considered an unconscionability defense in non-arbitration
contracts on twenty-four occasions, and they found unconscionable
201
three of those contracts, or 12.5%.
In contrast, Illinois courts
considered unconscionability arguments in twenty-one arbitration cases,
and, in six of those cases, or approximately twenty-nine percent, the
202
courts held those challenged arbitration provisions unconscionable.
However, like the Missouri courts, the Illinois courts often still enforce
the arbitration agreements after severing the unconscionable
196. See Pacificare of Nev., Inc. v. Rogers, 266 P.3d 596, 601 (Nev. 2011); Pacificare of
Nev., Inc. v. Meana, No. 55754, 2011 WL 5146064 (Nev. Oct. 27, 2011); see also infra Table 4.
197. See Mallin v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 839 P.2d 105, 118 (Nev. 1992).
198. See generally Rogers, 266 P.3d 596; Meana, 2011 WL 5146064; Gonski, 245 P.3d
1164; KJH & RDA Investor Grp., LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 281 P.3d 1192 (Nev. 2009)
(unpublished table decision); Clifton v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 238 P.3d 802 (Nev. 2008)
(unpublished table decision); Boulder Oaks Cmty. Ass’n v. B & J Andrews Enters., LLC, 169
P.3d 1155 (Nev. 2007); D.R. Horton, Inc., 96 P.3d 1159; Burch, 49 P.3d at 651.
199. Compare supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text, with supra notes 186–92 and
accompanying text.
200. See infra Table 4.
201. See infra Table 4. The three cases in which Illinois appellate courts found nonarbitration contract provisions unconscionable include Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854
N.E.2d 607, 625 (Ill. 2006); Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265, 276 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009); and Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 411 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980).
202. See infra Table 4. The six cases in which Illinois courts found arbitration provisions
to be unconscionable are Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill. 2006);
Timmerman v. Grain Exch., LLC, 915 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Keefe v. Allied
Home Mortg. Corp., 912 N.E.2d 310, 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Wigginton v. Dell, Inc., 890
N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 818
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 858 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006); and Parker v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 734
N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Despite the fact that the Kinkel decisions involve the same
parties and legal issues, I have included both decisions because they are technically different
court decisions. See generally Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d 250; Kinkel, 828 N.E.2d 812.
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203

provision. Like Missouri and New Mexico courts, Illinois courts have
204
also been hostile to contract provisions barring class action arbitration.
What these numbers demonstrate is that these four
unconscionability-sympathetic states, unlike the states discussed
previously, illustrate the exact problem that concerned the U.S.
Supreme Court, as well as many legal scholars: the tendency to apply the
unconscionability doctrine in a way that invalidates arbitration
205
provisions more often than other types of contract provisions.
Certainly, the numbers indicate that the state courts in Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, and Illinois bear watching in the future. Because
Missouri, New Mexico, and Illinois courts have previously found
206
unconscionable provisions barring class action arbitration, it will be
interesting to see how those state courts choose react to AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion in the long term, and how those reactions affect
their application of the unconscionability doctrine to future arbitration
cases.
4. The Moderate Approach: The Middle Ground
In comparison to the states discussed supra, two other states in this
study, Ohio and Mississippi, represent a more moderate approach to the
unconscionability doctrine. Specifically, as demonstrated below, since
1980 appellate courts in Ohio and Mississippi have entertained
arguments regarding the applicability of the unconscionability defense
in numerous cases, and, in some cases, have determined that challenged
contract provisions—both arbitration agreements and non-arbitration
clauses—were unconscionable. However, although both Ohio and
Mississippi appellate courts are willing to consider unconscionability
arguments, those arguments have not had nearly the level of success that
they have had in Alaska, Arkansas, Vermont, Missouri, New Mexico,
207
and Nevada. Over time, Ohio and Mississippi courts have developed a
relatively balanced approach to unconscionability, both in the
arbitration and non-arbitration context.

203. See, e.g., Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 276–78; Keefe, 912 N.E.2d at 320; Wigginton, 890
N.E.2d at 549–50.
204. See, e.g., Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 263–75; Wigginton, 890 N.E.2d at 548–49.
205. See infra Table 4.
206. See supra notes 183–84, 190, 204 and accompanying text.
207. Compare infra Table 5, with infra Tables 3–4.
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a. Ohio: A Significant Number of Unconscionability Cases, but a
Moderate Approach Overall
Between 1980 and 2012, Ohio appellate courts evaluated
unconscionability in any type of contract, whether including arbitration
208
or not, in 208 cases. Of those cases, 122 involved arbitration clauses,
or approximately fifty-nine percent, while eighty-eight cases, or
209
approximately forty-two percent, did not. In reality, those figures are
skewed because the first unconscionability challenge to an arbitration
210
clause was not heard at the appellate level in Ohio until 1987. If only
looking at the time period from 1987 through 2012, Ohio appellate
courts heard 195 unconscionability challenges to contracts of various
types, including 122 cases involving arbitration clauses, or 62.56%, and
211
seventy-five cases that did not involve arbitration clauses, or 38.46%.
These numbers strongly suggest that in Ohio, parties are more likely to
use the unconscionability doctrine to challenge contracts when
arbitration clauses are at issue.
Having found that parties are more likely to challenge arbitration
clauses than other types of contracts on the basis of unconscionability, a
second question immediately begs attention: Are Ohio appellate courts
more likely to find an arbitration clause unconscionable than they are to
find other types of contracts? Based on several scholarly critiques of
212
prominent cases, I expected to find a significant difference in the
numbers in this area. Much to my surprise, those expectations were not
met. When looking at appellate holdings from 1987 through 2012, I
found that appellate courts were slightly more likely to find nonarbitration contracts unconscionable than they were to find arbitration
agreements unconscionable. During that time period, twenty out of 122
arbitration clauses were found unconscionable, equating to 16.39% of
213
arbitration clauses evaluated.
In comparison, during that same time
208. See infra Table 5.
209. See infra Table 5.
210. The first Ohio appellate case involving an unconscionability challenge to an
arbitration agreement was Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, No. 52700, 1987 WL 16532 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1987).
211. See infra Table 5.
212. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 4, at 491–94 & nn.152, 158, 163, 173 & 180, 499 & n.219;
Gavin, supra note 4, at 267–68 & nn.136–38; Randall, supra note 4 at 194–95 & n.35, 213–14 &
n.107.
213. See infra Table 5. The twenty cases in which appellate courts found a challenged
arbitration clause to be unconscionable include Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859,
865–67 (Ohio 1998); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1251–53 (Ohio 1992)
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period, courts found twelve out of seventy-five non-arbitration contracts
unconscionable, equating to sixteen percent of other contracts
214
evaluated.
Moreover, if one also considers the contract cases
involving unconscionability analysis between 1980 and 1987, between
1980 and 2012, courts found a total of seventeen out of eighty-eight nonarbitration contracts unconscionable, which is 19.32% of cases decided
215
on those grounds. Thus, historically, Ohio appellate courts have been
(plurality opinion) (Wright, J., concurring); Rude v. NUCO Educ. Corp., 2011-Ohio-6789,
¶ 30 (Ct. App.); Wascovich v. Personacare of Ohio, Inc., 943 N.E.2d 1030, 1039 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2010); Brunke v. Ohio State Home Servs., Inc., 2008-Ohio-5394, ¶ 18 (Ct. App.); Hayes
v. Oakridge Home, 886 N.E.2d 928, 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 908 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio
2009); Bayes v. Merle’s Metro Builders/Boulevard Constr., LLC, 2007-Ohio-7125, ¶ 40 (Ct.
App.); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 860 N.E.2d 1058, 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006),
rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 884 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 2008); Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006Ohio-4500, ¶ 28 (Ct. App.); Schwartz v. Alltel Corp., 2006-Ohio-3353, ¶ 36 (Ct. App.);
Porpora v. Gatliff Bldg. Co., 828 N.E.2d 1081, 1086 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Eagle v. Fred
Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1185 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Nefores v. BrandDirect
Mktg., Inc., 2004-Ohio-5006, ¶ 58 (Ct. App.); Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19,
24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Angione v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., No. CA-9216, 1993 WL 364831,
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1993); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Apisdorf, No. 61075, 1992 WL
333131, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1992); Ellison v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., No.
E-90-73, 1991 WL 254232, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1991); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
No. 90AP-178, 1991 WL 19175, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991); In re Wagle v. J.C.
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2518, 1989 WL 49404, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 8, 1989); Trupp v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 N.E.2d 847, 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), abrogated by
Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d 1242.
214. See infra Table 5. The twelve cases in which appellate courts found a challenged
non-arbitration contract or clause to be unconscionable between 1987 and 2011 include
Anderson v. Ballard, 2010-Ohio-3926, ¶ 47 (Ct. App.); Swayne v. Beebles Invs., Inc., 891
N.E.2d 1216, 1224 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008); Martin v. Byke, 2007-Ohio-6816, ¶ 34 (Ct. App.);
Scott Reising Jewelers, Inc. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., Nos. C-050322, C-050329, 2006 WL
6576746, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2006); Renken Enters. v. Klinck, 2006-Ohio-1444,
¶¶ 21, 24 (Ct. App.); Muscioni v. Clemons Boat, 2005-Ohio-4349, ¶ 23 (Ct. App.); AmirTahmasseb v. Reyes, 832 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); O’Donoghue v. Smythe,
Cramer Co., 2002-Ohio-3447, ¶ 31 (Ct. App.); Taylor v. Eggleston, No. 92-A-1742, 1993 WL
418489, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 4, 1993); Tillimon v. Dukes, No. L-91-343, 1992 WL
206878, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1992); Walker v. D.W. Enters., Inc., No. 90-C-38,
1991 WL 142802, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 1991); Orlett v. Suburban Propane, 561
N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
215. See infra Table 5. In addition to the cases cited supra in note 214, courts found
contract clauses in the following non-arbitration cases to be unconscionable: Lane v. UltraLite, Inc., No. L-84-087, 1984 WL 14220, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1984); Carl v.
DeCapua, No. 80AP-889, 1982 WL 3979, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1982); Chem. Bank
v. Mesler, No. CA79-04-0036, 1981 WL 5115, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 9, 1981); Evans v.
Graham Ford, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); and Youngstown Steel & Alloy
Corp. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., Nos. 78 C.A. 180, 78 C.A. 181, 1980 Ohio App.
LEXIS 13954, at *18–19 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1980), aff’d sub. nom. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 423 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1981).
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more likely to find non-arbitration contracts to be unconscionable than
216
arbitration agreements—19.32% to 16.39%, respectively.
The thing that was most striking in evaluating these cases, however,
was the number of cases that could not be fit into either the
“unconscionable” or “not unconscionable” category. In a significant
number of cases, the appellate court did not determine whether the
contract provision at issue, whether an arbitration clause or not, was
unconscionable. Instead, in these cases, the court found that the trial
court had failed to adequately consider unconscionability and therefore
remanded the case back to the trial court for further fact-finding,
evidentiary hearings, or other determinations with respect to the
unconscionability issue. Although one finds this result in both
arbitration and non-arbitration cases, there are some stark differences
between the two. On eight occasions between 1980 and 2012, the
appellate courts remanded non-arbitration cases back to the trial courts
for an unconscionability determination, amounting to 9.09% of this type
217
of case.
In contrast, appellate courts have been much more likely to remand
cases dealing with arbitration clauses back to the trial courts for further
proceedings related to the unconscionability issue. On thirty occasions
the appellate courts have remanded arbitration-clause cases back to the
trial court for further unconscionability proceedings, a number that
encompasses 24.59% of all arbitration-clause-unconscionability
218
appeals. Even more striking, all but eight of these cases were decided
216. See infra Table 5.
217. See infra Table 5. The eight cases in which appellate courts remanded nonarbitration contract cases back to the trial court for an unconscionability determination
include Five Star Fin. Corp. v. Merch.’s Bank & Trust Co., 949 N.E.2d 1016, 1019, 1022 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2011); Schamer v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 2004-Ohio-4249, ¶¶ 17, 20 (Ct. App.); Info.
Leasing Corp. v. GDR Invs., Inc., 787 N.E.2d 652, 656–57 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Beneficial
Mortg. Co. of Ohio v. Leach, 2002-Ohio-2237, ¶¶ 74, 87 (Ct. App.) (per curiam); Nat’l City
Bank v. Bailey, No. 2257-M, 1994 WL 122167, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1994); Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. A.B.C. Dock, Inc., No. 1809, 1987 WL 10450, at *6, *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30,
1987); Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co., 475 N.E.2d 127, 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); and
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 423 N.E.2d at 156.
218. See infra Table 5; see also Brownell v. Van Wyk, 2010-Ohio-6338, ¶ 31 (Ct. App.);
Reynolds v. Crockett Homes, Inc., 2009-Ohio-1020, ¶ 20 (Ct. App.); Roe v. Rent-A-Center,
Inc., 2008-Ohio-4307, ¶ 29 (Ct. App.); Blubaugh v. Fred Martin Motors Inc., 2008-Ohio-779,
¶ 11 (Ct. App); Goodwin v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-6327, ¶¶ 13, 17 (Ct. App.); Khoury v.
Denney Motors Assocs., Inc., 2007-Ohio-5791, ¶¶ 20–21 (Ct. App.); Samoly v. Landry, 2007Ohio-5707, ¶¶ 36–37 (Ct. App.); Strader v. Magic Motors of Ohio, Inc., 2007-Ohio-5358, ¶ 31
(Ct. App.); Barnes v. Andover Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 2007-Ohio-4112 ¶¶ 34–35 (Ohio App.
Ct.); Klimaszewski v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-3766, ¶ 2 (Ct. App.); Castro v. Higginbotham,
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between 2003 and 2008, with appellate courts remanding cases nine
219
times in 2007 alone. Although the numbers at first may not seem that
significant, an analysis of the percentage of cases remanded for further
proceedings or fact finding during this time period is instructive. For
example, in 2003, cases remanded to trial courts for further proceedings
related to the unconscionability issue totaled three out of six arbitration220
clause cases, or fifty percent. In comparison, the appellate courts did
221
not find any arbitration clauses unconscionable that year. During the
following year, 2004, appellate courts remanded three out of twelve
arbitration cases to the trial courts for further proceedings, or twenty222
five percent of those cases. Over the next two years, only four cases
223
out of twenty-two were remanded on those grounds. But in 2007 there
was a resurgence—nine out of sixteen cases, or almost two out of three
224
arbitration unconscionability cases heard on appeal, were remanded.
2007-Ohio-3260, ¶ 11 (Ct. App.); Post v. ProCare Auto. Serv. Solutions, 2007-Ohio-2106, ¶ 36
(Ct. App.); Bencivenni v. Dietz, 2007-Ohio-637, ¶ 15 (Ct. App.); Yessenow v. AUE Design
Studio, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); Olah v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006Ohio-694, ¶¶ 31–33 (Ct. App.); Molina v. Ponsky, 2005-Ohio-6349, ¶ 24 (Ct. App.); Barr v.
HCF, Inc., 2005-Ohio-6040, ¶¶ 17, 21 (Ct. App.); Pyle v. Wells Fargo Fin., 2004-Ohio-4892,
¶ 17 (Ct. App.); Benson v. Spitzer Mgmt., Inc., 2004-Ohio-4751, ¶ 21 (Ct. App.); McKee v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2004-Ohio-3874, ¶¶ 15–16 (Ct. App.); Hampton
v. Swad, 2003-Ohio-6655, ¶ 10 (Ct. App.); McDonough v. Thompson, 2003-Ohio-4655, ¶ 20
(Ct. App.); Miller v. Household Realty Corp., 2003-Ohio-3359, ¶¶ 40–41 (Ct. App.);
Neubauer v. Household Fin. Corp., 2002-Ohio-6831, ¶ 26 (Ct. App.); Poling v. Am. Suzuki
Motor Corp., No. 78577, 2001 WL 1075720, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2001); Sikes v.
Ganley Pontiac Honda, No. 79015, 2001 WL 1075726, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2001),
abrogated on other grounds, as recognized in GB AZ 1, LLC v. Ariz. Motors, LLC, 2011Ohio-1808, ¶¶ 6–8 (Ct. App.); Battle v. Bill Swad Chevrolet, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 1167, 1172–73
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Haga v. Martin Homes, Inc., No. 1998AP050086, 1999 WL 254530, at
*5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1999); Dunn v. L & M Bldg., Inc., No. 75203, 1999 WL 166023,
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1999); Smith v. Ohio State Home Servs., Inc., Nos. 16441,
16445, 1994 WL 200801, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 1994).
219. See infra Table 5; see also supra note 218.
220. See infra Table 5; see also Hampton, 2003-Ohio-6655 ¶ 10; McDonough, 2003-Ohio4655, ¶ 20; Miller, 2003-Ohio-3359, ¶¶ 40–41.
221. See infra Table 5.
222. See infra Table 5; see also Pyle, 2004-Ohio-4892, ¶ 17; Benson, 2004-Ohio-4751,
¶ 21; McKee, 2004-Ohio-3874, ¶¶ 15–16.
223. See infra Table 5; see also Yessenow, 848 N.E.2d at 566; Olah, 2006-Ohio-694,
¶¶ 31–33; Molina, 2005-Ohio-6349, ¶ 24; Barr, 2005-Ohio-6040, ¶¶ 17, 21.
224. See infra Table 5; see also Goodwin v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-6327, ¶ ¶13, 17 (Ct.
App.); Khoury v. Denney Motors Assocs., Inc., 2007-Ohio-5791, ¶¶ 20–21 (Ct. App.); Samoly
v. Landry, 2007-Ohio-5707, ¶¶ 36–37 (Ct. App.); Strader v. Magic Motors of Ohio, Inc., 2007Ohio-5358, ¶ 31 (Ct. App.); Barnes v. Andover Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 2007-Ohio-4112 ¶¶ 34–
35 (Ct. App.); Klimaszewski v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-3766, ¶ 2 (Ct. App.); Castro v.
Higginbotham, 2007-Ohio-3260, ¶ 11 (Ct. App.); Post v. ProCare Auto. Serv. Solutions, 2007-
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The following year the numbers again declined, and only two out of
225
twelve cases, or 16.67%, were remanded. What these numbers suggest
is that, at the trial level, courts still struggle with how to apply the
unconscionability doctrine to evaluate arbitration clauses and often fail
to treat them as they would other contracts. That is true even though
trial courts do not seem to face the same problem—that is, at least not
to the same degree—when they evaluate other, non-arbitration contract
provisions for unconscionability.
b. Another Moderate State: Mississippi
Mississippi is another state that has taken a more moderate
approach to unconscionability in the context of arbitration agreements.
Mississippi has applied the unconscionability doctrine in twenty-eight
cases, including: twenty-two cases in which only arbitration provisions
were challenged; three cases in which only non-arbitration provisions
were challenged; and three cases in which both arbitration and non226
arbitration contract clauses were challenged.
Although since 1980
Mississippi courts have considered unconscionability arguments much
more often in cases involving arbitration agreements than other types of
contract provisions, that fact has not made it more likely that the courts
were sympathetic to unconscionability arguments in the arbitration
227
context; instead, the opposite is true.
In the six cases in which Mississippi appellate courts considered nonarbitration agreements, the courts found the challenged provisions
228
unconscionable in five cases, or eighty-three percent of the time.
In
contrast,
Mississippi
courts
found
arbitration
agreements
unconscionable in seven out of twenty-five cases, or twenty-eight

Ohio-2106, ¶ 36 (Ct. App.); Bencivenni v. Dietz, 2007-Ohio-637, ¶ 15 (Ct. App.).
225. See infra Table 5; see also Roe v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2008-Ohio-4307, ¶ 29 (Ct.
App.); Blubaugh v. Fred Martin Motors Inc., 2008-Ohio-779, ¶ 11 (Ct. App.).
226. See infra Table 5.
227. See infra Table 5.
228. The five cases in which Mississippi courts found non-arbitration provisions
unconscionable include Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732,
741 (Miss. 2007), overruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of
Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911
So. 2d 507, 525 (Miss. 2005) (en banc), overruled by Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So.
3d 695; Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553, 558 (Miss. 2005) (en banc); Entergy Miss., Inc. v.
Burdette Gin Co., 726 So. 2d 1202, 1208 (Miss. 1998); and Covington v. Griffin, 19 So. 3d 805,
817 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
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229

percent of the time. In looking solely at the three cases in which the
courts considered both types of contract provisions, the courts found
non-arbitration provisions unconscionable in all three cases but only
found the challenged arbitration provisions unconscionable in one
230
case.
A couple of other trends are also worth noting. Like some of the
states in the other categories, even if a Mississippi appellate court finds
an arbitration provision unconscionable, it may just sever the offending
231
provision and enforce the remainder of the arbitration agreement.
Mississippi courts also seem particularly concerned with possible
unconscionability in the context of nursing home contracts, as eight of
the cases solely challenging arbitration provisions and two of the cases
challenging both arbitration and non-arbitration provisions involved
232
contracts for nursing home care. The courts found unconscionability
233
in five of the nursing home cases involving only arbitration clauses and

229. The seven cases in which Mississippi courts found arbitration provisions
unconscionable include Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d at 706; Pitts, 905 So. 2d at
558; E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 717 (Miss. 2002) (en banc); Covenant Health &
Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin ex rel. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092, 1099 (Miss. Ct. App.
2009) (en banc); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel.
Braddock, 14 So. 3d 736, 743 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 14 So. 3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Trinity
Mission Health & Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Scott ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d 735, 741 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2008); and Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, 988 So. 2d 910, 924 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2007). Despite the fact that the Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock decisions involve the
same parties and legal issues, I have included both decisions because they are technically
different court decisions. See generally Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695;
Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d 736.
230. See generally Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (only non-arbitration provisions were
unconscionable); Vicksburg Partners. L.P., 911 So. 2d 507 (only non-arbitration provisions
were unconscionable); Pitts, 905 So. 2d 553 (both challenged arbitration and non-arbitration
provisions were unconscionable).
231. See, e.g., Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d at 743; Estate of
Scott ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d at 741, 743; Barber, 988 So. 2d at 924.
232. See Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d at 701, 706; Brown, 949 So. 2d at
741; Vicksburg Partners, L.P., 911 So. 2d at 510, 525; Lumpkin ex rel. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d at
1094, 1099; Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d at 738, 743; Estate of Scott
ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d at 741–43; Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775,
778, 784–85 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Cmty. Care Ctr. of Vicksburg, LLC v. Mason, 966 So. 2d
220 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007); Barber, 988 So. 2d at 914, 924; Covenant Health & Rehab. of
Picayune, LP v. Estate of Lambert ex rel. Lambert, 984 So. 2d 283, 285, 289 (Miss. Ct. App.
2006).
233. See generally Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695; Lumpkin ex rel.
Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092; Scott ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d 735; Covenant Health & Rehab. of
Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d 736; Estate of Barber, 988 So. 2d 910.
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found the regular provisions, but not the arbitration provisions,
234
unconscionable in the two combination cases.
5. Montana: A Different Approach to the Unconscionability Issue
On the surface, Montana does not appear much different from many
of the other states analyzed in this study. The Montana Supreme Court
has applied unconscionability analysis to contract provisions on fourteen
occasions since 1980, including five cases in which arbitration
agreements were challenged and nine cases involving other types of
235
contract provisions. The court found that one arbitration agreement
and one non-arbitration contract had unconscionable provisions,
amounting to twenty percent and a little over eleven percent of those
236
types of provisions, respectively. Thus, it appears that based on these
limited numbers, Montana courts are more likely to find arbitration
provisions unconscionable than other types of contract provisions.
These numbers, however, do not tell the entire story. First, the only
case in which the Montana Supreme Court found an arbitration
237
agreement unconscionable was decided in 1999. Thus, for more than a
decade, no party has successfully used the unconscionability doctrine to
challenge an arbitration agreement at the appellate level in Montana.
238
239
Like some of the other states, Ohio being the most notable, Montana
trial courts also sometimes failed to properly complete the
unconscionability analysis. As a result, on four occasions the Montana
Supreme Court remanded cases back to the trial court for further
240
consideration of a party’s unconscionability arguments. The remands
amounted to one-third of unconscionability cases involving nonarbitration provisions, and one-fifth of those involving arbitration
241
agreement challenges.
234. See generally Brown, 949 So. 2d 732; Vicksburg Partners, 911 So. 2d 507.
235. See infra Table 6. Because Montana does not have an intermediate court of
appeals, the Montana Supreme Court is the only state court with appellate jurisdiction.
236. See infra Table 6.
237. See generally Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999).
238. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 217–25 and accompanying text.
240. See infra Table 6. One of those cases involved an arbitration agreement. See
generally Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 123 P.3d 237 (Mont. 2005). The other
three cases involved challenges to non-arbitration provisions. See generally Am. Music Co. v.
Higbee, 103 P.3d 518 (Mont. 2004); Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142 (Mont. 1989); Eigeman v.
Miller, 745 P.2d 320 (Mont. 1987).
241. See infra Table 6.
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But contract law in Montana has evolved somewhat differently than
242
it has in the other states analyzed in the instant study.
Although
Montana’s unconscionability doctrine has both a procedural and
substantive component, like many of the states in this study, the
Montana Supreme Court’s unconscionability analysis is somewhat more
narrowly focused than the general requirements for procedural and
243
substantive unconscionability discussed supra.
Therefore, the
Montana Supreme Court has stated that “[u]nconscionability requires a
two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are unreasonably
favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the
244
part of the other party regarding acceptance of the provisions.”
Applying this test, Montana courts first ask whether the contract at issue
245
If it is, and the contract terms are more
is a contract of adhesion.
favorable to the drafter than the other party, the court will refuse to
246
enforce it on the basis of unconscionability.
What complicates our understanding of Montana’s approach to the
unconscionability doctrine is how it intersects with Montana courts’
application of the theory of reasonable expectations and its significant
247
hostility to contracts of adhesion in general.
Although the Montana
Supreme Court may use the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate
contract provisions, when the case involves a contract of adhesion the
248
analysis rarely reaches an unconscionability determination. Instead, in
these circumstances, the court may use the doctrine of reasonable
expectations or public policy grounds to invalidate the challenged
249
contract provision.
Even when a contract provision may not be unconscionable,
Montana courts will refuse to enforce a contract provision when that
242. In fact, one scholar has claimed that “the Montana Supreme Court’s view of
contract law is out of balance.” Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitration in Montana,
66 MONT. L. REV. 139, 150 (2005).
243. See supra Part II.B.2.
244. Summers v. Crestview Apartments, 236 P.3d 586, 590 (Mont. 2010) (citing Iwen v.
U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 995 (Mont. 1999)).
245. See, e.g., Graziano v. Stock Farm Homeowners Ass’n, 258 P.3d 999, 1004 (Mont.
2011).
246. See, e.g., Summers, 236 P.3d at 590–91 (holding that accelerated rent clause in lease
agreement was unconscionable because lease was a contract of adhesion and clause unfairly
benefited landlord more than tenant).
247. See id. at 590–91.
248. See id.
249. See Graziano, 258 P.3d at 1004.
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provision fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the non-drafting
250
party.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations was first applied to
insurance contracts, but courts have also applied it to many other types
251
of contracts. The Montana Supreme Court has stated that:
Reasonable expectations derive from all of the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a contract, such as the business
experience and sophistication of the consumer . . . any routine
practices between the parties established through prior dealings,
whether the consumer studied the agreement and understood it,
whether the consumer had the advice or representation of
counsel, and whether the provisions of the agreement were
252
explained to the consumer.
Legal scholar Scott Burnham has argued that the Montana Supreme
Court has modified the doctrine of reasonable expectations to make it
easier to invalidate arbitrate agreements specifically, evidencing the
253
court’s ongoing hostility to arbitration.
Although Montana courts separate an inquiry into the parties’
reasonable expectations from their unconscionability analysis, these
types of circumstances appear to be exactly the types of facts often
considered by courts in determining whether a contract is procedurally
254
unconscionable. Thus, although the Montana Supreme Court has not
specifically defined its reasonable expectations analysis in terms of the
unconscionability doctrine, a reasonable conclusion is that it could fit
within that framework. For purposes of this study, however, I based my
evaluation of Montana case law solely on the Montana court’s definition
and use of the unconscionability doctrine. Therefore, these numbers do
not include cases where the Montana Supreme Court determined that a
contract was unenforceable based upon a determination that the
contract did not meet the challenging party’s reasonable expectations.

250. See id. Scott Burnham has described these types of contract provisions in this way:
“Knowing that I am unlikely to read it, the drafter might . . . take advantage of [his] superior
bargaining position to slip in terms which, even though not unconscionable, would not be
reasonably expected by a party to that contract.” Burnham, supra note 242, at 154.
251. See Burnham, supra note 242, at 153–55.
252. Graziano, 258 P.3d at 1004–05 (citing Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 491
(Mont. 2009)).
253. See generally Burnham, supra note 242.
254. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
So, the real question is, what do all of these numbers mean?
Certainly, one of the first conclusions that can be drawn is that at least
some of our understanding of how state courts apply the
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements needs to be
reconsidered in light of the numbers. Although there are still some
states, such as Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, and Illinois, that are
more likely to find arbitration agreements unconscionable than other
255
types of contracts, the vast majority of states do not appear to take
256
that approach.
Instead, there is quite a bit of variety in how state
courts view the unconscionability doctrine in general, as well as how
they apply the doctrine to both arbitration and non-arbitration
provisions.
In fact, some states really do not have much of a track record
257
regarding unconscionability at all, especially in comparison to states
258
259
like California, or, in this study, Ohio. Other states may have cases
that, if viewed in isolation, would suggest hostility towards arbitration
agreements. However, when viewed in the context of more than thirty
years of case law, those cases prove to be outliers that do not represent
the whole. Thus, before drawing conclusions about an individual state’s
application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements,
it is really necessary to specifically investigate that particular state’s case
260
law on the issue.
255. See infra Table 4.
256. See supra Part IV.
257. See infra Table 2.
258. See generally Broome, supra note 4.
259. See supra Part IV.B.4.a.
260. This study analyzed the case law from only twenty states. Although a sample of
forty percent is substantial and provides a good understanding of the full unconscionability
spectrum, it is impossible to know with certainty where other states fall on that spectrum
without taking a similar approach to those states’ case law. Further, future studies may
choose to delve further into the factual bases of these cases and how courts apply the
unconscionability doctrine to specific contexts in order to determine what further patterns
emerge.
For example, it may be possible to develop our understanding of the
unconscionability doctrine even further by examining who was more likely to appeal the trial
court’s determinations regarding unconscionability: (1) the party who asserted
unconscionability as a defense, who lost at the trial level, or (2) the party who argued against
unconscionability at the trial level, but lost. It would also be useful to further explore the
types of provisions the courts have found more and less problematic, and also the general
types of contracts found unconscionable or not unconscionable (i.e., nursing home,
employment, consumer, insurance, commercial, etc.). Finally, it would also be instructive to
look for correlations between the issuance of major U.S. Supreme Court precedents on the
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Another conclusion can also be drawn from the numbers. For at
least some states that have drawn criticism for their application of the
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements, such as Ohio,
those cases can be outliers that are not representative of the general
rule. And case law further suggests that, at least in some states, there
has been an improvement in the courts’ analysis of unconscionability
issues and the development on a more sophisticated understanding of
261
unconscionability law.
These results suggest that other states may
moderate their approach to unconscionability in the long term,
especially in light of U.S. Supreme Court cases such as AT&T Mobility
262
LLC v. Concepcion. Ultimately, this study suggests that it is best to
withhold judgment regarding individual states’ approaches to
unconscionability, at least until it is possible to ground oneself in that
state’s case law on the issue. Although the unconscionability doctrine
has a long history, it is still in flux, particularly in its application to
arbitration agreements.

unconscionability issue.
261. See supra Part IV.
262. See supra Part IV.
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Table 1
Unconscionability Cases—All 20 States
Year
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980

Non-arb/
OK
1
5
11
10
2
6
7
5
3
5
5
3
2
9
5
3
6
6
6
4
2
5
7
5
1
7
7
8
6
6
4
6
4

Non-arb/
unc
0
2
2
4
1
2
3
5
0
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
3
0
2
0
2
3
2

Non-arb/
remand
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
3
0
0
1
0
0
1
0

Arb/
OK
9
10
8
9
15
13
15
12
13
6
10
2
4
1
4
0
0
1
0
2
2
2
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0

Arb/
unc
3
5
4
7
9
4
5
4
5
2
2
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Arb/
remand
0
0
2
1
3
10
2
3
4
3
1
2
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

TOTAL

172

46

13

142

60

35

All
Cases
13
22
26
30
30
34
32
27
27
17
19
7
9
14
11
3
6
7
8
8
9
12
8
9
3
12
11
8
9
7
6
10
6
460

264

Total
Unc
3
6
6
11
10
6
8
8
5
2
3
0
3
2
2
0
0
0
0
2
4
5
1
3
1
1
3
0
2
0
2
3
2
105

263. For each year of the study, this chart provides the following information: (1) the
number of non-arbitration cases in which appellate courts rejected unconscionability
arguments; (2) the number of non-arbitration cases in which courts determined that
provisions were unconscionable; (3) the number of non-arbitration cases remanded to the
trial court for further unconscionability determinations; (4) the number of arbitration cases in
which courts rejected unconscionability arguments; (5) the number of arbitration cases in
which courts determined that provisions were unconscionable; (6) the number of arbitration
cases remanded to the trial court for further unconscionability determinations; (7) the total
number of cases in which courts considered unconscionability arguments; and (8) the total
number of cases in which courts found any contract provision unconscionable.
264. Eight cases included in this study contain both arbitration and non-arbitration
provisions and have thus been accounted for in both the arbitration and non-arbitration
columns of Table 1, but appear as a single case for purposes of the total cases column. The
years affected by these dual-provision cases include 2000, 2002, 2005 (two cases), 2007, 2009,
2010, and 2011. See infra notes 265–68.
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Table 2
The “Conservative” Approach to Unconscionability
States

Colorado
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
Nebraska
New
Hampshire
North
Carolina
Oregon
Rhode
Island
South
Carolina

Total
Cases

Arb
Cases

Nonarb
Cases

Total arb
Unconscionable

9
0
10
22
5

2
0
5
1
0

7
0
5
21
5

0
n/a
0
0
n/a

Total
non-arb
Unconscionable
1
n/a
0
2
1

5

0

5

n/a

1

20
9

8
7

12
2

1
1

0
1

2

0

2

n/a

1

9

7

2

1

0
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Table 3
States that Generally Embrace the Unconscionability Doctrine
States
Alaska
Arkansas
Vermont

Total
Cases

Arb
Cases

11
11
265
6

3
1
1

Nonarb
Cases
8
10
6

Total arb
Unconscionable
1
1
1

Total non-arb
Unconscionable
4
4
3

Table 4
States More Sympathetic to the Unconscionability Doctrine in the
Arbitration Context
States

Missouri
Nevada
New Mexico
Illinois

Total
Cases

Arb
Cases

24
9
15
266
43

13
7
9
21

Nonarb
Cases
11
2
6
24

Total arb
Unconscionable
10
3
7
6

Total
non-arb
Unconscion
-able
2
0
0
3

265. One of the Vermont cases involved both arbitration and non-arbitration provisions,
and the Vermont Supreme Court found that both types of clauses were unconscionable. See
Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1054 (Vt. 2011). Thus, this Table counts that case in
both categories.
266. Two of the Illinois cases involve unconscionabilty analysis of both arbitration and
non-arbitration provisions, and, thus, they are counted in both categories. Those cases
include All Am. Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 934 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); and
Bishop v. We Care Hair Dev. Corp., 738 N.E.2d 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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Table 5
States with a Moderate Approach to the Unconscionability Doctrine
States

Ohio
Mississippi

Total
Cases

Arb
Cases

Nonarb
Cases

Total arb
Unconscionable

208267
28268

122
25

88
6

20
7

Total
non-arb
Unconscionable
17
5

Table 6
Montana’s Approach to the Unconscionability Doctrine
States

Montana

Total
Cases

Arb
Cases

14

5

Nonarb
Cases
9

Total arb
Unconscionable
1

Total
non-arb
Unconscionable
1

267. Two of the Ohio cases involve unconscionabilty analysis of both arbitration and
non-arbitration provisions, and, thus, they are counted in both categories. Those cases
include Bozich v. Kozusko, 2009-Ohio-6908 (Ct. App.); and O’Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer
Co., 2002-Ohio-3447 (Ct. App.).
268. Three of the Mississippi cases involve unconscionability analysis of both arbitration
and non-arbitration provisions, and, thus, they are counted in both categories. Those cases
include Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss. 2007),
overruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel.
Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507
(Miss. 2005) (en banc), overruled by Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695; and
Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 2005) (en banc).
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